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 Abstract
Taking as its starting point, the ANC’s election priorities of halving poverty and
unemployment, the paper reviews pronouncements of the ANC in conference, and in
government, in an attempt to discover more precise specifications of the two goals, and what
they entail. Failing to find precision anywhere, an attempt is made to discover what changes
in the relevant magnitudes are required to meet the probable goals. As far as unemployment
is concerned, these are shown to depend, in the first instance, on what is understood by
‘halving’ (rate of unemployment or number unemployed; official or expanded). Once that is
known, the behaviour of the three variables that determine unemployment rates and levels:
the rate of growth of the potential labour force, the rate of change of the participation rate, and
the rate of job creation, has to be considered. Predicting their likely course, an always difficult
task, is made more difficult still by weaknesses in the statistics. Simulations suggest that
under the most optimistic conditions, halving the official rate of unemployment would require
3.7 million jobs to be created between 2004 and 2014. Halving the number of expanded
unemployed under pessimistic assumptions about the growth rate of the economically active
would require 11 million jobs in the same period. Government’s inability to exert significant
influence on any of the three determining variables suggests it goes back to the other social
partners who took part in the Growth and Development Summit (where commitment to the
goal was reaffirmed) to negotiate achievable targets, this time armed with proper information
about the size of task.
Unlike unemployment, poverty levels can, through the social security system, be directly
affected by government. The United Nations Millennium Declaration laid out a series of goals
to which most countries, included South Africa, are committed. One of them is to halve
absolute poverty (defined, in the absence of a national poverty line, as being below
$1(US)/day). Although there is some confusion in government about the goal (one
Department of Social Development document refers to halving the number of poor), that
should easily be dispelled. Problems in the case of this goal result from the inability of
researchers to determine the numbers of people below the line denoting ‘absolute’ poverty.
In the first place, there is no agreed poverty line. This is less important than the next problem
– the poverty of the statistics from which poverty estimates have to be constructed. One
aspect of this is the difficulty of estimating the value of the ‘social wage’ (social spending) to
poor individuals and households.
Simulation, using what are hoped to be plausible guesses at the missing or dubious values, is 
only way around these problems. Drawing on the results of another study (Meth, 2004), the
paper presents a set of estimates of poverty at various levels, made using a variety of
assumptions where data are weakest. These examine the period 1997-2002. Given the
margin of ignorance in the data, it is probably impossible to say much about poverty
headcounts, rates or gaps at the poverty line chosen to denote absolute poverty. It is clear,
though, that if the social wage reached its intended recipients, that a catastrophic increase in
the poverty headcount would have been averted. It also seems likely that even if the
headcount rose, the poverty gap could have declined. As the poverty line is raised, the
number of poor stabilises at a high level (roughly 20 million). It shows little sensitivity to
increases in the assumed values of the social wage. This suggests a limit to the efficacy of
existing and planned anti-policy measures. It is recommended that better surveys to gather
information on the extent and severity of poverty be designed and implemented as a matter of 
urgency. A heavy concentration of academic firepower on the highly resistant problem of
valuation of the social wage is also recommended.
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Introduction
A recently published paper by Ravi Kanbur posed ‘some hard questions about growth,
inequality and poverty’. Prominent among them is that of:
“… what exactly it is that we are buying into when we accept the 
number one Millennium Development Goal of the United Nations – 
halving  the incidence of income poverty by the year 2015.” 
(Kanbur, 2004, p.1)
The question is of more than passing interest in South Africa. The country is committed to
meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).1  In addition, the social partners have
committed themselves to halving unemployment. The target year for meeting these goals is
the year 2014, the 20th anniversary of democracy in South Africa. These laudable aims
featured prominently in the recent general election – at the head of a list of ‘Some of the most
important targets and objectives making up Vision 2014’ in the ANC’s 2004 election
manifesto, we find:
• Reduce unemployment by half through new jobs, skills development, assistance to
small businesses, opportunities for self-employment and sustainable community
livelihoods.
• Reduce poverty by half through economic development, comprehensive social
security, land reform and improved household and community assets. (ANC, 2004,
p.8)
It is unreasonable to expect an election manifesto to spell out precisely what all of its
aspirations entail. For purposes of the evaluation of performance that must take place,
however, greater precision is necessary. This paper looks behind the manifesto at policy and
other documents in an attempt to discover what is understood by these commitments.
Finding little evidence of a considered view, the paper delves into unemployment and poverty
statistics in South Africa in an attempt to see whether or not greater precision than that
displayed so far in specifying each of these targets, is possible. In each case, the search
opens a window overlooking an impressively wide plain of ignorance. In view of this, the
paper ends with some recommendations about what to do about the two commitments.
The paper’s limitations must be stated at the very outset. It does not concern itself unduly with
the question of whether proclaiming commitment to the ‘halving’ targets is a good or bad
thing. The attempt it makes to evaluate progress towards the achievement of these goals is
perfunctory. In the case of the poverty target, the paper focuses primarily on income poverty,
doing so in full awareness of the fact that approaches that have the reduction of income
1
1 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are spelled out in a resolution called the Millennium Declaration,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN, 2000a).
A goal is defined as an aim or desired result, whereas a target is defined as an objective or result towards which
efforts are directed.
poverty as their sole end have long since slipped into disfavour.2  There is, however, virtue in
looking at income poverty – as long as one does not lose sight of the fact that it is one aspect
of what is a complex multi-dimensional problem.
The government position on ‘halving’
From pronouncements made by senior politicians, it is possible to infer that when it comes to
halving unemployment, government has in mind the official rate of unemployment.3  It is not
easy, though, to find an explicit statement to this effect. First port of call in the search for
greater specificity was the “programme of action” page on the government website. That part
of the site is devoted, however, to medium- and short-term targets. There is nothing on the
unemployment goal under the Economic, Investment and Employment cluster, and nothing
on poverty reduction under the Social cluster.4 That avenue being closed, the next set of
documents consulted were those prepared for, and emerging from the ANC’s 51st National
Conference in December 2002. For our purposes, the most important among these were two
papers distributed in advance of the National Policy Conference (held in September 2002) to
formulate views to be taken forward to the National Conference. These papers (ANC 2002a
and 2002b) outlined economic and social policy in a way that shaped the resolutions adopted
at the National Conference. References to poverty and unemployment abound in each paper.
Neither of them however, quantifies the problem in such a way as to facilitate the drafting of
resolutions that set clear and comprehensible targets. Of course, information on poverty and
unemployment (particularly the latter), was widely available elsewhere. Even so, the
omission of any discussion of feasible targets in the background papers could have
hampered delegates whose access to, and understanding of the nature of both problems was 
limited.
Given the silence of the background papers on the matter, it comes as little surprise to find no
specific poverty reduction target in the place where one would expect to find it, viz., the
Resolutions adopted by the 51st National Conference of the ANC on Social Transformation
2
2 Maxwell (2004a, p.3) is eloquent on this point, as are many others. One would have to be both blind and deaf to
have missed the debate on the inadequacies of a simple money metric of poverty. The same applies to the
headcount measures that poverty lines yield. Their weaknesses, if used in isolation, are far too well-known to
require recitation here.
3 Responding to the release in March 2004 of the then most recent Labour Force Survey (LFS) results, which
registered a fall in the official rate of unemployment falling from 31.2 per cent in March 2003 to 28.4 per cent in
September 2003, the Minister of Labour welcomed the development in a press release headed “THE RECENT
EMPLOYMENT FIGURES INDICATES THAT THE ANC GOVERNMENT AND ITS SOCIAL PARTNERS ARE
COMMITTED TO HALF (sic) UNEMPLOYMENT BY 2014”.
The press release, replete with a reference to the (statistically insignificant) 57 000 jobs created over the period,
ignores the explanation offered by Statistics South Africa for the decline in the official unemployment rate, namely
that the number of not economically active persons increased by almost one million; the number of discouraged
(non-searching) unemployed rising from 3.17 million in March 2003 to 3.82 million in September 2003 (Statistical
Release P0210, 25 March 2004, p.iii).
The juxtaposition of references to the official rate of unemployment with the Minister’s confident assertion that:
“This government is on track to meeting its stated goal of halving unemployment by 2014” in the press release,
makes it seem highly likely that the goal is indeed the official rate of unemployment.
4 Website http://www.info.gov.za/issues/poa/index.html checked on 19th September 2004.
section under the heading ‘On Attacking Poverty and Comprehensive Social Security’ (ANC,
2002c). None of the thirteen resolutions adopted refers to any poverty reduction target.
Likewise, the place to find an unemployment target, one would have thought, would have
been among the twelve resolutions in the section ‘Unemployment & Under-employment’ in
the Resolutions on Economic Transformation. It is not there; instead it is to be found in the
‘Appendix to Economic Resolutions: Comments on Key Performance Indicators for
Outcomes: Employment’. In the Appendix, ‘The unemployment rate’ (which rate is not
specified), is one of the key performance indicators identified. Below the list of indicators is a
paragraph of comments, the first sentence of which reads:
“We want to halve the current level of unemployment by 2014”.
Since ‘The unemployment rate’ (which one is not stated) is to serve as a key performance
indicator, it seems safe to assume that ‘level’ means ‘rate of unemployment’. Attempts to find
a more specific commitment have not proved successful. The unemployment reduction
target agreed upon at the Growth and Development Summit of 2003 (GDS) is very similar to
the ANC Conference Resolution. Paragraph 2.2.1 of the GDS Agreement states simply that
“The constituents aim to halve unemployment by 2014” (Nedlac, 2003). This succeeds, by
virtue of its failure to indicate whether the goal is the rate of unemployment, or the number of
unemployed, in being even less communicative than the ANC conference resolution. There
is no indication of which of two measures – the official or the expanded – the constituents had
in mind. Establishing that outcomes will differ when one, rather than the other, of these
possible goals is chosen, is the work of but a few moments. That being so, it may seem a little
surprising that greater effort was not devoted to achieving greater clarity. It may have been
feared or suspected that an attempt to do so at the Summit, a step that would, inevitably, have 
exposed the large differences between different targets, would lead to serious disagreement.
Difficult as it may be to believe, it is also possible that people simply took it for granted that if
one form of unemployment is halved, the other(s) would follow suit. For the framers of the
resolution to halve unemployment, the most attractive candidate would have been the
‘official’ rate, a target that is appealing both because of its official (i.e., internationally
accepted) status, and because the official rate, being so much lower than the expanded rate,
would appear to be easier to reach. Further speculation on this matter is pointless –
interviews with participants in the discussions are necessary to settle the question.
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Someone, somewhere, however, is, or has been working on the question. The website of the
Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP), a relative newcomer on the scene, informs us
that:
“To reach government’s target of halving unemployment by 
2014 (i.e. reducing the unemployment rate from 30% to 15%) 
546,000 new jobs would have to be created each year – 276,000 
more than has hitherto been the case.”5  Downloaded 
from http://www.epwp.gov.za/, 8th November 2004.
From this, one may infer that it is the official rate of unemployment which is to be halved. The
statement is repeated in a paper by the person in charge of the EPWP, Dr Sean Phillips, Chief
Operations Officer in the National Department of Public Works. The paper in question was
delivered at a recent conference called “Overcoming Underdevelopment in South Africa’s
Second Economy”.6  As source for these figures, Phillips cites Statistics South Africa’s
September 2003 Labour Force Survey (Phillips, 2004, p.1). An examination of that document
discloses it to be entirely innocent (as one would expect) of such information. At the time of
writing, the source remains unknown.7
So much for the likely target – discovering which year is to constitute the base against which
to measure progress in the attempt to halve unemployment is also not straightforward. The
statement taken from Appendix to the Resolutions of the 51st National Conference of the
ANC, suggests that it could be the year 2002. The official rate of unemployment was 25.8 per
cent in September 2000, and 30.2 per cent in September 2002. By September 2003, it had
dropped back to 28.2 per cent.8  Given the volatility of the numbers, it is not unduly pedantic to
request some clarity on this head.
Poverty eradication, rather than mere reduction, an ambitious goal,9 exercised the minds of
those who attended the Copenhagen World Summit on Social Development in 1995.
Paragraph 25 of the Programme of Action said that there was an urgent need for:
4
5 The number of jobs created each year is a matter of lively dispute (discussed further below). If Casale, Muller and
Posel (2004, p.16) are to be believed, the total number of jobs created between 1995 and 2003 could have been
as low as 1.4 million, or about 175 000 per annum, rather than the 270 000 per annum implied by the figures that
Phillips cites.
6 This conference, a joint effort whose main sponsor was the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA), was held
in Pretoria on 28th-29th October 2004.
7 A request for information on the source of the passage cited above has been made to Dr Phillips (pers. comm. 3rd
November 2004).
8 Unemployment rates are from the Labour Force Surveys (Statistical Release P0210) for the relevant months.
9 Constituencies represented at the Growth and Development Summit (GDS) committed themselves to a vision that 
includes poverty eradication (Nedlac, 2003, paragraph 1.2.3), identifying it as a priority for national collaborative
action (paragraph 1.2.4). The GDS document is silent on what targets this goal might imply.
“National strategies to reduce overall poverty substantially,
including measures to remove the structural barriers that 
prevent people from escaping poverty, with specific 
time-bound commitments to eradicate absolute poverty by a 
target date to be specified by each country in its national context …”
In Paragraph 26, governments were urged to give:
“…greater focus to public efforts to eradicate absolute poverty
and to reduce overall poverty substantially by (inter alia): … 
elaborating, at the national level, the measurements, criteria 
and indicators for determining the extent and distribution of
absolute poverty. Each country should develop a precise 
definition and assessment of absolute poverty, preferably 
by 1996, the International Year for the Eradication of Poverty.”
In the Programme of Action published after the Copenhagen gathering, there is a guideline
for developing a precise definition of poverty. Absolute poverty, it says, is:
“… a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic 
human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation
facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends 
not only on income but also on access to social services.” 
(Paragraph 19, Chapter 2).
In the year 2000, the UN Millennium Declaration added dates and specific targets to the
Copenhagen exhortation.10  Participating governments committed themselves:
“To halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s
people whose income is less than one dollar a day11 and 
the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and, by
the same date, to halve the proportion of people who are 
unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water.”
South Africa was committed to the Copenhagen Programme of Action – the Minister of Social 
Development may be found reaffirming this in the year 2000.12  Numerous statements
5
10 A brief account of the emergence of the MDG and its targets may be found in Maxwell (2004b).
11 Although the dollar-a-day poverty line has attracted criticism, cogent reasons for adopting it have been offered by
Chen and Ravallion (2001), and Deaton (2003a). Some of these are discussed below.
12 See the Foreword to the National Report on Social Development, 1995 – 2000 (DSD, 2000).
affirming South Africa’s commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG),
reaffirmed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, may
be found. Once again, however, it is not clear what base year the state has in mind for setting
its poverty reduction goal. If poverty has been increasing, the year 2000 may be a more
attractive base year than 2002, or 2004.13
Although the MDG is quite specific, confusion has still managed to arise within the South
African government. In its Strategic Plan for the years 2002/03 – 2004/05, the Department of
Social Development states that:
“The challenge for the Department is to ensure that its
short term and medium term poverty relief and poverty
alleviation measures contribute towards the Millennium
Goal of halving the number of people who live in extreme
 poverty by 2015.”  (Emphasis added).
Misunderstandings of this sort are going to give rise in the future, to the sort of acrimonious
debate that took place in the run-up to the 2004 election over the extent of job creation
between 1995 and 2002.14  If targets are not agreed upon with greater precision than is
evident above, disparities between actual outcomes and people’s understanding of the
(loosely worded) targets could be the cause of considerable strife. In the absence of a clear
statement of what, precisely, the targets are, commentators on the economy have already
begun to insert their own interpretations into the discourse. Prof Sampie Terreblanche, for
example, having done so, is adamant that the poverty and unemployment reduction targets,
as he understands them, will not be met. Here he is in full cry, after having berated the ANC
for being unwilling to acknowledge during its election campaign that “… the poverty problem
has become more severe over the past decade”, and after claiming that “[M]ore than 48
percent of the population – or 22 million – live under the poverty line”:15
“The ANC election manifesto”, he says, “promises that 
poverty and unemployment will be cut by half over the 
next 10 years. This implies that by 2014 only 24 percent of
6
13 Unemployment rates are from the Labour Force Surveys (Statistical Release P0210) for the relevant months.
14 In the absence of an authoritative critique of the ‘official’ estimates, this debate was ‘won’ by the former Minister of
Trade and Industry, simply by sticking to those official (statistical) ‘facts’. He disarmed his opponents by admitting
that most of the two million jobs allegedly created (particularly those in the informal sector) were not of the sort
desired by government. See the articles ‘Doomsayers take liberties with the facts on unemployment’, Sunday
Times (Business Report), February 22, 2004, and ‘Erwin digs in his heels on employment data’, Mercury
(Business Report), February 23, 2004. Would-be contributors to the debate fumed and fulminated, some
disclosing a woeful ignorance of South Africa’s labour statistics in the process – the ‘facts’ were simply not to be
controverted. A recent, unpublished paper by Casale, Muller and Posel (2004) suggests, however, that the true
total may be much lower, possibly as low as 1.4 million.
15 These figures are close to those in the recently released UNDP estimates (UNDP, 2003, p.5). They are also
similar to those used in the Ten Year Review (PCAS, 2003). We consider them, and their provenance below.
the population will live below the poverty line and that 
unemployment will be cut from 42 percent to 21 percent 
of the labour force. These goals are completely unattainable,
especially if the government is to stick to its economic 
approach of neo-liberalism and free marketeerism”.
Owing to the sharp increase in the population over the past 20 years, the potential labour
force will have 3 million more people in 2014 than at present. To cut unemployment to 21
percent will necessitate the creation of almost 7 million new jobs. That is impossible.” (This
Day, Thursday, 29th April 2004)16
The date when these chickens come home to roost lies quite far in the future – the fact that
the article contains estimates of conditions at that distant point, implies that the figures must
have been cranked out by a model, however crude. Some critical assumptions have to be
made in order to convert unemployment reduction targets into ‘numbers of jobs’. There are
two major determinants of the level of unemployment that operate independently of the
number of jobs created or destroyed. One of these is mentioned in the article cited above: the
growth of the working age population (roughly, those between the ages of 15 and 64 years).
The other is the growth of the participation rate – the proportion of the working age population
that is either working or is unemployed.
Without access to Prof. Terreblanche’s calculations, it is not easy to see how he arrived at his
results. If he had used the same data as that used in the simulations reported on below (for
the period 2003-2014), then a growth rate of 1.7 per cent per annum for the working age
population, coupled with a static participation rate, would have been associated with a target
of seven million jobs to meet the unemployment reduction target. The problem is that the
working age population grows in this scenario by 5.7 million.17  There is an important lesson to 
be learned from this experience, one that flows from the fact that making assumptions about
the values these variables take is unavoidable. The lesson is the following: if sensible debate
is going to take place, the assumptions used to arrive at any conclusion have to be spelled out
in detail so that their plausibility may be considered. This is of particular importance in dealing
with ‘difficult to predict’ numbers such as these. We consider the sort of assumptions that
have to be made below. Before doing so, however, let us ponder for a while on the forms that
an unemployment reduction target could take.
7
16 A recent article by Miriam Altman of the HSRC in This Day (“The Employment Equation”, 8 July 2004), takes it for
granted that it is the official (strict) rate that is to be halved (from 30 to 15 per cent). According to her, this would
entail the creation of between 400 000-500 000 jobs per annum, a goal that is beyond the reach of the economy.
17 This is not to suggest that Prof Terreblanche’s results are necessarily incorrect. It is also not to suggest that
assumptions and data sources should be spelled out in detail in a newspaper article designed for popular
consumption. It would have helped, though, if a reference to the work from which these results are drawn had been 
made.
Different ways to halve unemployment
Either of the two forms of unemployment measured by the official statistics, unemployment
according to the ‘official’ definition, which counts as unemployed, only those actually seeking
work, or unemployment according to the expanded definition – the officially unemployed plus
the ‘discouraged’ (the non-searching unemployed), could have been specified as the goal.
Although the evidence suggests that it is a rate that is targeted, it would also be possible to
target the numbers of unemployed. Discovering what ‘halving’ implies if it is taken to mean
reducing the number of unemployed to half their total at some date, is simplicity itself – simply
divide the relevant total by two. The arithmetic involved in trying to determine the numbers by
which unemployment totals have to be reduced if it is the rate of unemployment that is to be
halved is not much more difficult. The presence, however, of two unknowns – the rate of
growth of the population of working age (the potentially economically active population) and
the participation rates – about which recent history is not very forthcoming, makes the always
difficult job of guessing what the future holds, more difficult still.
Table 1 summarises the position as portrayed in the official statistics. The lines across the
table below the 1999 and September 2002 results signify discontinuities. In the case of the
1999 figures, the break was caused by the changeover from the October Household Survey
to the Labour Force Survey as the main instrument for collecting data on labour market
activity. The break after September 2002 arises because the March 2003 and September
2003 LFS results have been weighted to the 2001 Population Census results, whereas the
earlier LFS and the OHS figures are weighted to the 1996 census.
Since there are two definitions of unemployment, it follows that there must be two different
participation rates, one corresponding to each definition of unemployment. The most
remarkable features of the table are the ten percentage point rise in the official participation
rate, and the eight percentage point rise in the expanded participation rate between October
1999 and February 2000.
8
Table 1:  Participation rates and the working age population
Participation rates (%) Working agepopulation
Official Expanded (1000s) % change
Oct 96 46.7 56.2 24 657 -
Oct 97 46.6 57.5 25 112 1.85
Oct 98 48.8 58.4 25 710 2.38
Oct 99 51.5 61.8 26 280 2.22
Feb 00 61.3 69.7 26 455 0.67
Sept 00 58.7 67.9 26 894 1.66
Feb  01 59.3 69.3 27 121 0.84
Sept 01 56.1 67.7 27 364 0.90
Feb 02 58.3 69.6 27 673 1.13
Sept 02 56.7 67.7 27 984 1.12
March 03 56.9 67.6 29 555 -
Sept 03 54.1 66.7 29 917 1.22
Source: Labour Force Surveys and October Household Surveys for the relevant periods.
Notes: See file ‘Unempl_(1996-2001).xls’
Better collection of statistics accounts for a significant part of these differences. There was an
unprecedented increase of 2.7 million in the number of economically active, according to the
official (strict) definition. The average for all other years (October to October for the OHSs, or
September to September for the LFSs) is about 420 000.18  The 2.7 million consist of 1.2
million additional officially unemployed, 1.2 million subsistence agricultural workers, and
about 200 000 domestic workers. All other employment changes are trivial. To suggest that
there could have been an increase in the number of subsistence agricultural workers from an
improbably low 300 000 in October 1999 to a plausible 1.5 million in February 2000 (only to
fall back to an unbelievable 360 000 by September 2001), is to stretch the imagination
beyond breaking point. Both low figures simply have to be incorrect.
9
18 This average hides, however, quite a wide range of changes. The number of economically active according to the
strict definition reportedly fell by 436 000 between September 2000 and September 2001, and rose by 974 000
between October 1998 and October 1999. See spreadsheet ‘Unempl_(1996-2001).xls’, worksheet
‘Unemployment’. Copies of the relevant spreadsheets are obtainable from the author at meth@ukzn.ac.za or
chasmeth@telkomsa.net.
On average, the number of officially unemployed grew by about 340 000 or so over the period
1996-2002. The changeover from the OHS to the LFS yields a figure almost four times
greater than that average.19  When the first Labour Force Survey results were published,
Statistics South Africa included in the publication, an appendix in which a number of ways of
reconciling the OHS and LFS unemployment totals, were considered Stats SA, 2000a,
pp.12-13). The unemployment total that finally makes its way into the official statistics for the
month of February 2000, 4 333 000, is one of several that could have been used. After
adjustment, it can be reduced to 3 545 000. Instead of continuing the series with the relevant
adjustments built into it, Statistics South Africa chose to use the definition that produces the
higher figure. Some large part of the increase between October 1999 and February 2000 is
therefore accounted for by this change. In other words, there is a radical discontinuity in the
unemployment series at this point – the number of officially unemployed did not actually
increase from 3 158 000 in October 1999 to 4 333 000 in February 2000, nor did the official
rate of unemployment suddenly jump from 23.3 to 26.7 per cent. The numbers may not be
compared because the series contains a break.
For all practical purposes, the apparent increase in participation rates from 1996 to the
present can be ignored – it is extremely unlikely to have happened. This means that the
explanation trumpeted by government in its Ten Year Review for the increase in
unemployment rates, the ‘fact’ that “the economically active labour force grew by about 4%
although the population growth was only 2% per year” (PCAS, 2003, p.96) is almost certainly
wrong.20  If, as seems likely, the LFSs were picking up about two million more economically
active than the OHSs, then the probable growth rate of the economically active population
over the period 1995-2002/3 could have been somewhere in the region of about 2.5-2.8 per
cent per annum. This may have been greater than the rate of job creation (it was certainly
10
19 Once again, there are some large outliers. The October 1998 to October 1999 change was a fall of 5 000, while
October 1997 to October 1998 figure was an increase of 712 000. The LFS figures are better behaved. See
spreadsheet ‘Participation.xls’, worksheet ‘Unemployment’.
20 The Ten Year Review claims that there were 11.5 million economically active in 1995, and 15.4 in 2002. These
figures correspond well with the Statistics South Africa estimates of 11.5 million in October 1996, and 15.9 million
in September 2002. As we have seen above, the ‘true’ figure for 1996 should have been larger by at least one
million (and possibly more) because of the subsistence agricultural workers. The huge increase in the number of
officially unemployed between October 1999 and February 2000, casts doubt on the validity of the series for
official unemployment. The claimed increase in the number of economically active (almost four million, PCAS,
2003, p.96) is incorrect.
Seizing upon the alleged ‘fact’ of the substantial massive rise in participation rates, government has wasted no
opportunity to advance it as an ‘explanation’ of rising unemployment. An article in Business Day of October 14,
2003, by Alan Hirsch, Chief Director: Economic Sector in the Policy Coordination and Advisory Services (PCAS) in 
the Presidency, headed ‘Unemployment rises even as jobs are created’ sees him dissolving the ‘Jobs Paradox’ by 
reference to the ‘fact’ that the economically active population grew at about five per cent per annum [the EAP
reportedly grew from 11.5 million in 1995 to 16.8 million in 2003], while job growth averaged about 2.5 per cent per
annum.
Suitably retreaded, a very similar article, again written by Hirsch, appeared in This Day on May 21, 2004, this time
under the heading of ‘The unemployment paradox’. Once more, the (imaginary) five per cent growth in the
economically active population is contrasted with the 1.6 per cent growth in the population. The same explanation
for the alleged rise as that used on earlier occasions, an increase in participation by African women, was trotted
out.
greater than the rate of population growth), but not by so much as to be responsible for any
significant proportion of the tremendous surge in the numbers of unemployed.21
Since the Labour Force Surveys were introduced, there has been a steady fall in participation
rates, both the official and the expanded. The decline is more prominent, markedly so, in the
case of the official participation rate. The September 2002 and March 2003 figures, as noted
above, are not comparable because the former are weighted by the 1996 Population Census
and the latter by its 2001 counterpart. If this does not affect ratios like the participation rate (as 
one assumes it will not) then the fall in the official participation rate between February 2000
and September 2003 is an astonishing 7.2 percentage points. If it is not appropriate to
compare the 1996-weighted results with the 2001-weighted figures, the decline between
February 2000 and September 2002 is a still not inconsiderable 4.6 percentage points.
There was a decline in the number of officially unemployed of 680 000 (from 5.25 million in
March 2003 to 4.57 million in September 2003). Since there was not a similar fall in the
number of expanded unemployed (the number fell from 8.4 to 8.3 million), the fall in the official
unemployment rate from 31.2 to 28.2 per cent is accounted for mainly by an increase in the
number of discouraged workseekers.22  As matters stand, the September 2003 total number
of economically active according to the official definition, is roughly the same size as the
February 2000 total. What use the official statistics on participation rates (the figures in the
first two columns of Table 1) are for peering into a murky future, is not easy to say. It is
possible that the rate has now either stabilised or is declining slowly. This is suggested by the
expanded participation rate, whose behaviour is a little more sedate than the official
participation.
Accurate estimates for the other variable with which we are concerned, the working age
population (the potential workforce), should, one would have thought, have been too difficult
to construct. Inter-censal figures pop out of a demographic model.23  These can then be
revised as required when new population census figures become available. It is not unusual
for a new census to inflict grievous bodily harm on existing series – the 2001 census is no
exception. There is a jump of almost two million in the working age population from
September 2002 to September 2003, much of it presumably caused mainly by the
reweighting to the latest census. Scanning the figures, it would seem that the number of
people of working age grows by about 600 000 to 700 000 per annum. When the LFSs have
all been reweighted to the 2001 census, the jump at March 2003 will (may?) be ironed out.
This looks as though it will leave us with a growth rate of the potential workforce of
somewhere in the region of about two per cent per annum.
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21 The article by Miriam Altman in This Day (8 July 2004) cited above, suggests that the labour force might be
growing at about 2.5 per cent per annum. She goes on to argue that “[O]nce Aids starts having a larger impact, we
could expect that the labour force might grow on average between 1 percent and 2 percent a year over the next 10
years.”
22 Their numbers rose from 3.2 million in March 2003 to 3.8 million in September 2003, a jump of 590 000. See
spreadsheet ‘Participation.xls, worksheet ‘Unemployment’.
23 Doubts have been expressed as to the reliability of the current mid-year estimates.
To guessstimate the numbers that may be involved if unemployment is to be ‘halved’, one has 
to engage in a little simulation. To do that, it is necessary to assume boundary values for the
two growth rates discussed above. In the face of the confusion spelled out above, it is clear
that the estimates of the values of the two variables at issue might take over the period that
ends in 2014 must be, at best, one part science, and nine parts guesswork. If the major
impact of AIDS on the working age population (which is also the sexually active population)
has yet to be felt, it is likely that the growth rate of the working age population will fall. There is
speculation that it could reach zero in a decade. That would imply a workforce growth rate of a 
little more than one per cent per annum over the period. Accordingly, a figure of one per cent
is used as a lower bound in the simulations performed below. To be on the safe side, an upper 
bound of 2.5 per cent per annum has been selected.
As far as participation rates are concerned, rapid population growth and pent-up demand for
additional years of schooling in the early 1990s (along with other aspects of the social
transition described in the Ten Year Review) may have been responsible for a bulge in
participation rates in the late 1990s. Those effects have, however, probably worked their way
through the system. A possible scenario is a stabilisation or slow secular decline in
participation rates, and a moderate increase in the size of the potential workforce. An upper
bound of 0.3 per cent per annum, and a lower bound of –0.1 per cent have been used in the
simulation whose results are presented in Table 2.24  In the two simulations, one thus has the
potential labour force growing relatively slowly and the participation rate falling (Scenario 1).
In the other scenario, both grow rapidly (Scenario 2).
The boundary values selected, which attempt to capture the movements described above,
serve to demarcate the area within which it is thought that the true values of these variables
might lie.25  Although they ‘feel’ feasible, they are not cast in stone – anyone who disagrees,
can easily substitute figures that are believed to be more appropriate.
To judge whether or not the ‘halving unemployment’ target has been met, some base period
figures are required. The outcome could be sensitive to the choice of period. The Growth and
Development Summit (at which the ‘halving unemployment’ goal was formally adopted) took
place in June 2003. One possible candidate is thus the latest set of figures available at the
time that the commitment was made. The relevant base period figures would be those for
September 2002. Another possibility is the latest set of figures available at the time the ANC
resolved to ‘halve the current level of unemployment by 2014’. Those would be the February
2002 figures, published in September 2002.26  Fortunately (except, of course, for the
unemployed), the results for the two periods do not differ greatly, so from that point of view,
choosing one or t’other does not make a great deal of difference. The figures for September
2002 are used in the simulation whose results are presented in Table 2, partly because unlike
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24 These values may be changed in the spreadsheet ‘Halving unemployment.xls’, worksheet ‘Unemployment-1’,
cells M11:12, M25:26, M39:40).
25 Various combinations of growth rates in between have been tried – these produce results that lie between the
extremes generated by the ‘slow’ and ‘fast’ growth scenarios.
26 See Statistical Release P0210, 25 September 2002.
the February figures, they are less susceptible to the effects of the flood of new entrants to the 
labour market at the beginning of the year.
In order of appearance, Table 2 presents the baseline statistics; the assumed values of the
two variables that generate Scenarios 1 and 2, and the increases in working age population
and economically active, implied by the assumed rates of growth of these variables.
Following this are the reductions in the numbers of unemployed required to yield the various
‘halvings’.27  After that, the results for different ‘halvings’ of unemployment are given. Finally,
we have the change that government policy has found most difficult to facilitate, the increases 
in employment required to deliver the various ‘halvings’.
If the ease with which an unemployment reduction target could be met were to be measured
by the number by which the unemployment total had to fall, then we see by inspection, that
halving the number of unemployed would require of officially unemployed to drop by 2.4
million (Row 3), and the number of expanded unemployed by 3.95 million (Row 4). Under
Scenario 2 conditions (the fast labour force growth option), the total number of officially
unemployed would need to fall by only 1.5 million (Row 19) over a decade to halve the rate,
apparently the easiest of targets. The Scenario 1 assumptions push this up a little, to 2.2
million (Row 17).
Were the reductions relevant to any of the targets in Rows 17-20, or the targets of halving
unemployment numbers, to be met, unemployment levels (rates and numbers) in the year
2014 would be reflected in one or other of the sets of figures given in Rows 22-38. Which of
the indicators of unemployment causes the most alarm and despondency is not known.
Assuming that it is the absolute number that is most distressing, the table presents the
estimates of the numbers of people who would still be unemployed after ‘halving’ had been
achieved. Commencing with the worst result, we discover that 5.5 million people (Row 27)
would still be unemployed under Scenario 2 conditions, if the target were a halving of the
expanded rate of unemployment. This is more than twice the number that would remain if the
target were the halving of the number of officially unemployed (some 2.4 million, Row 22). All
other ‘halvings’ produce results between these extremes. If, as has been suggested above, it
is the rate of unemployment that is being targeted, then from government’s point of view, this
first cut at the numbers suggests (rather obviously)28 that the official rate is the one to target.
This conclusion is strengthened as we make our way down the table. Halving the number of
unemployed (Rows 29-32) would more than halve unemployment rates in both scenarios. If
the target were a halving of the official rate of unemployment (from 30.5 to 15.2 per cent, Row
1), the expanded rate of unemployment would be somewhere in the region of 28-29 per cent
(Rows 34-35).
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27 Certain numbers need not necessarily be presentedit is obvious, for example, that if the target is to halve the
number of unemployed, either official or expanded, the number at the end of the period is obtained by dividing the
number in the base period by two. The same reasoning applies to the halving of an unemployment rate. The
halved rates have been omitted, the halved numbers have not.
28 This seems an obvious thing to do, because the numbers are all so much smaller at the start.
Table 2:   ‘Halving’ unemployment by 2014 – some possibilities
Base year results - Unemployment in September 2002
1 Official unemployment rate (%) 30.5
2 Expanded unemployed rate (%) 41.8
3 No. of officially unemployed (millions) 4.8
4 No. of expanded unemployed (millions) 7.9
Assumptions
6 Growth rate of working age population (%/annum) Scenario 1 1.0
7 Scenario 2 2.5
8 Growth of participation rate (%/annum) Scenario 1 -0.1
9 Scenario 2 0.3
Increase in working age population, 2003-2014 (millions)
11 Scenario 1 3.2
12 Scenario 2 8.7
Increase in number of economically active, 2003-2014 (millions)
14 Scenario 1 1.5
15 Scenario 2 6.2
Reduction in no. of unemployed to halve unemployment rate by 2014 (millions)
17 Scenario 1 Official 2.2
18 Expanded 3.6
19 Scenario 2 Official 1.5
20 Expanded 2.5
Number of unemployed in 2014 (millions)
22 Halving the number of unemployed: Both scenarios Official 2.4
23 Expanded 4.0
24 Halving the rate of unemployment: Scenario 1 Official 2.6
25 Expanded 4.3
26 Halving the rate of unemployment: Scenario 2 Official 3.4
27 Expanded 5.5
Rate of unemployment after number of unemployed has been halved by 2014 (%)
29 Scenario 1 Official 13.9
30 Expanded 19.0
31 Scenario 2 Official 11.0
32 Expanded 15.2
14
Expanded rate of unemployment after official rate has been halved (2014)
34 Scenario 1 29.3
35 Scenario 2 28.4
Official rate of unemployment after expanded rate has been halved (2014)
37 Scenario 1 5.2
38 Scenario 2 6.4
Required increase in no. employed to halve no. unemployed by 2014 (millions)
40 Scenario 1 Official 3.9
41 Expanded 5.8
42 Scenario 2 Official 8.6
43 Expanded 11.1
Required increase in no. employed to halve unemployment rate by 2014 (millions)
45 Scenario 1 Official 3.7
46 Expanded 5.4
47 Scenario 2 Official 7.6
48 Expanded 9.6
Source: Own calculations. See spreadsheet ‘Halving unemployment.xls’.
Associated with these high rates are the large numbers of expanded unemployed in Rows 25
and 27. Selecting the official rate of unemployment as the target thus has the undesirable
effect of leaving some very large number of people still unemployed. If the more difficult task
of halving the expanded rate were tackled successfully, the official rate would drop to five or
six per cent (Rows 37 and 38), a highly desirable outcome.
The question is, of course, whether such a goal is achievable?  The figures in Rows 46 and 48 
suggest that it is not. These figures give the numbers of jobs that have to be created in order
to get unemployment rates down to the desired levels. It is obvious that the Scenario 1
conditions (slow growth of the potential workforce and a slight decline in participation rates)
set the easiest employment targets. Even so, the task of creating 540 000 jobs per annum
(Row 46) would seem to lie well beyond the capacity of the economy. Were Scenario 2
conditions to obtain, almost ten million jobs (Row 48) would need to be created in a decade to
halve the expanded rate of unemployment. Worse still than this are the job creation demands
that would need to be met if the goal were a halving of the number of the expanded
unemployed. In the probably, unlikely event that the Scenario 2 conditions were realised,
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more than eleven million jobs (Row 43) would have had to have been created to meet the
goal.29
Clearly, if a goal has to be specified, then from the point of view of feasibility of attainment, a
halving of the official rate of unemployment is the most sensible, if not the most humane,
candidate. Its achievement would require somewhere between 3.7 and 7.6 million jobs to be
created (Rows 45 and 47), the number of officially unemployed would fall by between 2.2 and
1.5 million (Rows 17 and 19) between 2003 and 2014, and there would be between 2.6 and
3.4 million people officially unemployed in 2014 (Rows 24 and 26). The political problem, as
pointed out above, would be the fact that after the target had been met, there would still be
between 4.3-5.5 million unemployed according to the expanded definition (Rows 25 and 27),
with rates of unemployment in the region of 28-29 per cent (Rows 34 and 35).
Another set of outcomes, suggested by the behaviour of the labour market over the period
March-September 2003, is also possible (see footnote 3). Over this period, the official
unemployment rate fell from 31.2 to 28.4 per cent, while the expanded rate remained roughly
constant (42.1 per cent in March and 42.0 per cent in September). The upshot of this was that
the decline in the number of officially unemployed (623 000) was more than matched by the
increase in discouraged (non-searching) unemployed (648 000). The official participation
rate dropped from 56.9 to 54.4 per cent, while the expanded rate fell more modestly from 67.6 
to 67.2 per cent. In all of the simulations above, both participation rates were assumed to rise
or fall by the same percentages. As the experience recounted here demonstrates, this
assumption does not accord with labour market performance. Accordingly, a further set of
simulations were run to examine the impact, over time, of differential changes in the two
participation rates.30
Halving the official unemployment rate with the Scenario 1 assumptions (both participation
rates fall at 0.1 per cent per annum, working age population grows at a rate of 1.0 per cent per
annum) it will be recalled, sees the number of unemployed fall to 2.6 million, requiring some
3.7 million jobs to be created in the process. Using the 1.0 per cent working age population
growth rate assumption, and allowing the official participation rate to fall at 0.5 per cent per
annum, halving the unemployment rate would just about halve the number of unemployed
(4.8 million to 2.4 million). The number of jobs required to reach this goal, however, is only 2.5
million. The impact on the expanded rate of unemployment is, however, disastrous. The
Scenario 1, official rate halving leaves the economy with an expanded unemployment rate of
29.3 (6.1 million unemployed; 3.4 million discouraged). Adding those who fall out of the ranks
of the officially unemployed to the expanded unemployed (i.e., allowing the expanded
participation rate to be partly determined by changes in the official participation rate) arrests
the fall in the expanded unemployment rate at 36.6 per cent in 2014. The total number of
expanded unemployed is 7.8 million, of whom 5.4 million are discouraged.
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29 From the point of view of the poor, the most beneficial outcome is that which generates the largest number of jobs
– the interests of workers and the poor are best served if the number of unemployed is reduced by this means.
30 See worksheet ‘Unemployment-4’ in spreadsheet ‘Halving unemployment.xls’.
Although the official participation rate (ignoring discontinuities in the series) has fallen from a
high of 61.3 per cent in February 2003 to 54.4 per cent in September 2003, a further
sustained fall of the magnitude required to yield the outcome portrayed above seems unlikely.
That being so, the limiting case would probably require a minimum of about three million jobs
to be created between 2003 and 2014 – a not impossible task.
It seems likely that government’s concern is primarily with the officially unemployed. In the
body of the text of the Ten Year Review, for example, when unemployment totals are
discussed, it is only the officially unemployed to whom reference is made, and then only once
(PCAS, 2003, p.36). The composite index of economic participation specifically excludes the
discouraged (the non-searching unemployed), stating that “… this group is no longer
considered economically active …” (p.126). Yet shortly before this, in the list of performance
indicators, one finds under the heading ‘Employment’, “Number employed, broad definition,
(alternate) Percentage unemployed, broad definition.” (p.119). What ‘broad definition’ has to
do with employment is not clear, nor indeed, is the reason for the sudden appearance of the
‘broad’ definition of unemployment.31
Whatever government’s intentions, the analysis above suggests strongly that making a
political commitment to a goal the achievement of which is at the mercy of three variables
whose magnitude cannot be predicted with any accuracy, may not be a clever thing to do. As
has been shown, the magnitude of the undertaking depends on the rate of growth of the
working age population (the potential workforce) and the growth of the participation rate, with
the outcome in the target year determined by the performance of these two over time, and by
that of the third variable, the actual rate of job creation. The ex ante job creation tasks implied
by assumed values that generate Scenarios 1 and 2 differ by some substantial amounts (the
one scenario requires almost twice as many jobs to be created as its counterpart). Given the
levels of uncertainty about the values the three variables are likely to assume in the future, it is 
extremely difficult to be confident that even the most modest of the requirements for
unemployment halving can be met. That being so, we must ask why, in the first place, the
social partners committed themselves to a halving of unemployment?  A few speculations on
this interesting matter are offered at the end of the paper – let us turn now to the ‘halving’
poverty goal.
Halving poverty
In this section of the paper, we commence with a glance at the state of existing academic
studies. Hampered by paradoxical shortages of appropriate data (paradoxical because there
is now more household survey data available than ever before), these studies languish in a
state of relative impotence to help address the nation’s most pressing problem. After that, we
take a brief look at the contradictions (the antinomies) of definition and measurement. The
assumption that a shared commitment to poverty eradication will somehow produce
agreement on even the most basic of the steps that has to be taken, is shown to be naïve.
This is followed by an overview of the steps that government has taken to gauge the extent of
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31 These are the only references to the expanded unemployment rate in the document. The word ‘expanded’ is not
used anywhere else in the text in relation to unemployment.
the poverty problem in South Africa, and of its attempts to monitor progress in the fight
against this social evil. Widespread criticism of government’s failure to stem an alleged
increase in poverty and inequality, its numerous policies and programmes notwithstanding,
has provoked a defensive response, visible in official publications and speeches by senior
politicians. This polarisation bodes ill for the fight against poverty. It is almost with relief that
we turn from this to a discussion on some of the technical hazards of estimating income
poverty. The difficulties, however, as will be seen below, are formidable. Having mapped out
the minefield through which the estimator must travel, some estimates of the numbers of poor 
in South Africa from research I have recently done (Meth, 2004) are presented. These form
the basis of an attempt to gauge the size of the problem of halving by the year 2014, 32 the
proportion of South Africa’s people that is absolutely poor.
In the academic world, the Millennium Development Goals (with their dollar-a-day definition
of the income part of absolute poverty) are beginning to attract increasing attention. The goal
itself has come under scrutiny by Kanbur (2004), Maxwell (2004a; 2004b), and Clemens et al
(2004), as has the likelihood of countries achieving it (Hanmer and Naschold, 2003).
Accepting the MDG of halving ‘by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people’ that is
absolutely poor, Deaton (2003a) has offered a comprehensive analysis of ways in which
MDGs could (should) be monitored. In the present paper we climb no further up Deaton’s
proposed list of steps than the questioning of the appropriateness, in South Africa’s case, of
starting “… from the $1993 PPP poverty lines in Chen and Ravallion (2001)… ” (Deaton,
2003a, p.362). Instead, it is proposed that in the absence of an official poverty line to identify
the absolutely poor in South Africa,33 that a poverty proposed by Deaton himself (1997) and
applied to the 1993 SALDU/World Bank data set, be used. The reasons for this will become
clear as we proceed. As noted above, we also restrict ourselves mainly to income poverty, in
full awareness of the artificiality of doing so – as everybody knows, poverty is
multi-dimensional. Limiting ourselves in this way means that the estimates of the numbers of
poor presented may well understate the real extent of poverty, something that ought be borne
in mind before indulgence in premature congratulation at the extent of poverty reduction is
contemplated.
Poverty: Definition, measurement, monitoring and politics
As will have been gathered from the summary above of the concerns of this section of the
paper, the measurement of poverty and the monitoring of anti-poverty programmes and
policies is beset by more than mere technical and managerial problems. Behind these
problems is a struggle over the extent of redistribution required to eradicate poverty. To put
the matter crudely, those on the ‘left’ argue that significant redistribution is necessary – on the
‘right’, the preferred option is to limit redistribution to some minimum, and to rely for the rest on 
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32 The MDG target year, it will be recalled, is 2015. In South Africa, it has been brought forward to 2014, the year that
marks the 20th anniversary of democratic rule.
33 Saunders (1998, p.11) refers to an article by Tony Atkinson (1993) on the value of a poverty line that has some
official status. General acceptance of a particular line (or lines) can help to keep debates from wandering away
from wider research and policy issues into esoterica.
the workings of the market to lift the poor out of their poverty. Sandwiched awkwardly
between the demands of the have-nots and their champions, and the defenders of (as much
as possible of) the status quo as far as the distribution of income and wealth is concerned, is
government (which, of course, is not without strong views of its own on the matter).
Little wonder then, that government goes to such lengths to reel off statistics on the
magnanimity of redistributive policies introduced or reinforced and deracialised since its
accession to power. This trumpet blowing has, however, to be done in such a way as not to
antagonise the well-off too much. It must be reassuring for this jittery audience to hear the
stand taken by government against such proposals as the Basic Income Grant (BIG). The
President’s repeated (and unfounded) assertion of the ‘dependency’ that would inevitably
result from extensions of the social grant system to adults, must be music to the ears of
conservatives. This struggle over the form of anti-poverty policy is the context within which
the problems of definition, measurement and monitoring must be understood.
Poverty studies in South Africa: The current state of affairs
In the discussion on halving unemployment, it was argued that without a clear specification of
the target, confusion must reign. The same applies to the goal of ‘halving’ poverty, although,
as has been argued above, it is possible, at least for a while, for government to take refuge
from its critics in the confusion. The poverty studies in South Africa that should be able to
inform us of the progress (or lack thereof) in the fight against poverty, are not in good shape.
There are two separate but related problems. It is not easy to say which is the more serious of
them. The first is concerned with the absence of a rigorous distinction between
conceptualization, definition and measurement of poverty. These terms feature in the title of a 
recent paper by Noble et al (2004), that argues for a consensual approach to the problem.
Critically examining some of the more prominent poverty studies in South Africa (most of
which are referred to in the present paper), the Noble et al piece (pp.15ff) discloses slippage
between the three necessary stages of conducting a poverty study. Giving examples of cases 
where “… measurement that does not follow from a concept and definition employed …”, they
argue that:
“Current South African poverty studies tend predominantly
to be based around subsistence income or expenditure measures 
which do not necessarily have any firm definitional or 
conceptual underpinnings… ” (2004, p.18)
The second problem is that the studies themselves have to work with data which, in some
respects (e.g., sample frames) have improved over time, but in others (weighting,
non-response rates) have deteriorated. Within the limitations described by Noble et al (2004)
there exists a reasonably reliable34 set of poverty estimates for 1995, a year or so after the
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34 The word ‘reliable’ is used with some hesitation. Dr Ros Hirschowitz of Statistics South Africa reminded
participants workshop on measuring poverty in South Africa hosted jointly by the National Treasury and the World
Bank in Pretoria on 28th-29th June 2004, that the sample for the 1995 OHS and IES was poor.
advent of democracy in South Africa. Based, as they point out on subsistence expenditure
measures, these use the information in the 1995 Income and Expenditure Survey, the 1995
October Household Survey and the 1996 Population Census (Woolard and Leibbrandt,
2001). Much had been hoped for from the results of the long-awaited Income and
Expenditure Survey (IES) for the year 2000. The 2000 IES should have made it possible to
gauge the extent of poverty (and inequality) in that year. This would have provided a report
card on progress (or the lack of it) during the first five years of democratic rule. The
publication based on the IES, Earning and spending in South Africa (Statistics South Africa,
2002), suggested substantial increases in income and expenditure poverty (p.29). The
income share of the bottom quintile of households was also found to have fallen (p.46).
Unfortunately, this analysis, which should been authoritative, was so beset by problems that
its findings have been widely criticised, not least by government. In the wake of the failure of
the 2000 IES to deliver definitive answers on poverty and inequality, the public debate has
floundered in a morass of poorly supported assertions. These emanate both from those who
claim poverty and inequality have worsened, and those who deny that this is so.35
Extensive work has been done by Statistics South Africa on the 2000 IES to repair (to the
extent that it is possible to do so) its major deficiencies: faulty weighting of the survey results,
and non-response, the latter, especially among better-off households. The debate will take
another lurch forward when the revised figures are published. Out of this work of
reconstructing the 2000 IES results has flowed a much-discussed paper, which although
widely circulated, was hitherto non-quotable and non-citable (Hoogeveen and Özler, 2004).
The paper, the subject of heated controversy, which recently received the public imprimatur of
no less a luminary than Angus Deaton,36 will probably become the received wisdom in South
Africa. The authors find that both poverty, especially extreme poverty, and inequality
increased over the period 1995-2000. They report that:
“For any poverty line below 322 Rand per capita per month, 
the poverty gap and poverty severity (poverty gap squared)
indices are significantly higher in 2000 than they were in 1995. 
These increases in poverty accompanied positive expenditure
growth that was statistically insignificant. (2004, pp.10-11).
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35 The figures in the publication Earning and Spending in South Africa do not tell a happy story. It is very different
from that told by the wildly optimistic figures in the Ten Year Review (PCAS, 2003), considered below. Little
wonder, then, that the state jumped at the opportunity offered by the problems experienced with the 2000 IES, to
cast doubt on its results. Not long after the 2000 IES results were released, an article in the Financial Mail (31
January 2003) drew attention to the President’s preference for the figures produced by SA Advertising Research
Foundation’s (Saarf) over those produced by Statistics South Africa. Ferial Haffajee, author of the piece,
comments that the President is happier with Saarf’s development index, which paints “… a more glowing record of
delivery and a discernible rising tide. It’s from this report that Mbeki chose to quote in his annual address to the
National Council of Provinces last November and which his aides use to present a prettier picture.”
36 This blessing was given during the workshop on measuring poverty in South Africa, organised jointly by the
National Treasury and the World Bank, held in Pretoria on 28th-29th June 2004.
Inequality among the population as a whole fell slightly, but it rose among the African
population (2004, pp.16). Hoogeveen and Özler refer to a paper by Lam and Leibbrandt
(2003) which, using income data from the same data sources as they do, concludes “… that
incomes deteriorated for most South Africans.”  Lam and Leibbrandt also:
“… report that inequality within racial groups increased 
substantially while between group inequality declined only 
slightly, as a result of which total inequality increased in 
South Africa between 1995 and 2000.”
(cited in Hoogeveen and Özler, 2004, p.6).
Few other studies have appeared since the Earning and spending debacle. One of them (van
der Berg and Louw, 2003) tries, inter alia, to reconcile survey income data with national
accounting statistics. They estimate the poverty headcount at 16 033 948 in 1995, and either
16 261 294 (their ‘Optimistic’ estimate) or 17 239 710 (their ‘Pessimistic’ figure) in the year
2000. Corresponding poverty headcount ratios would have been 38.8 per cent in 1995, and
either 36.4 per cent (Optimistic) or 38.6 per cent (pessimistic) in 2000. According to them, the
sustained fall in the headcount ratio of poverty (it fell from 49.8 per cent in 1970 to 35.3 per
cent in 1990) went into reverse at some point thereafter. The number of poor increased by
about three or four million between 1990 and 2000, depending on whether their “Optimistic’ or 
‘Pessimistic’ figures are used (van der Berg and Louw, 2003, p.18).
A paper by Fedderke et al (2004) focussing more on inequality, is agnostic in its findings, the
results being sensitive to choice of data set. There may be other studies that have been
overlooked, but the sample above gives a flavour of academic endeavours on the topic. In
short, the academic community is divided in its assessment of the conditions of the poor, ten
years after the advent of democratic rule.
Addressing the problems that plague South African poverty studies (i) the absence of “firm
definitional or conceptual underpinnings” and (ii) the weaknesses of the available data sets is
no simple matter. The work by Noble and his collaborators, which should help to tighten the
‘concept – definition – measurement’ nexus, is still in its preliminary stages. There are some
defects in data sets which, once created, cannot be removed.
Yet another problem with existing poverty studies in South Africa has had attention drawn to it
by the state’s response to claims of increasing poverty and inequality. Going on the offensive,
state spokespersons have demanded (legitimately) that the impact on the welfare of the poor
of the ‘social wage’ be taken into account. We return to this issue below.
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The contradictions of definition and measurement
For purposes of measuring income poverty, a poverty line (or preferably, a “poverty critical
range” between two poverty lines (Woolard and Leibbrandt, 2001, p.49), must be identified.
South Africa does not have an official poverty line (or pair of lines identifying a poverty critical
range). This is not a desirable state of affairs. As Everatt points out:
“The failure to define poverty is not an academic matter:
it directly impacts on delivery. If poverty is undefined, 
programmes lack focus: it is not clear why this or that 
service is being provided, or to whom, or where and measuring 
progress and impact becomes near-impossible.” (2003, p.89)37
The conclusions of a paper by Ravallion and Sen capture, with admirable brevity, the central
problems involved in choosing among poverty lines. They observe that:
“Poverty measurement requires value judgements
and behavioural assumptions to help interpret the available
– and invariably imperfect – data. That will always be true. 
The more interesting question is how much bearing the choices 
made by analysts have on the key conclusions drawn” 
(1996, p.785).
If a poverty line (or range) is to be acceptable, it must satisfy two conditions:
“… firstly, that the methods on which it is based reflect 
‘best practice’ scientific research methodology and data;
and second, that the judgments on which it is based are 
broadly in line with community opinion on the meaning and 
measurement of poverty. The poverty line should be regularly 
exposed to these two criteria of scientific integrity and
community credibility if it is to be a valuable tool for monitoring
trends and policy impacts.” (Saunders, 2004, p.3)38
As far as scientific integrity is concerned, the criticisms made by Noble et al (2004) about the
absence of “firm definitional or conceptual underpinnings” to current poverty studies in South
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37 This comes shortly after Everatt has taken a (possibly well-deserved) sideswipe at the ‘small craft industry …
measuring poverty and deprivation’, now grown into a “major trans-national industry (in inverse proportion to
poverty reduction)”. (2003, p.88)
38 Saunders points to the crisis in Australian poverty research caused by the failure of existing poverty lines to meet
the criterion of scientific integrity. This weakness is exploited by conservatives keen to deny the persistence of
poverty (2004, p.1).
Africa, cast something of a pall over proceedings which, ultimately, must do more of the
same. It is not necessary, however, for paralysis to set in – Noble et al acknowledge that:
“… there is a need for a measurement of poverty
(or poverty line) for South Africa based on an absolute 
concept and defined, perhaps, by reference to the Copenhagen 
Declaration (1995) …” (2004, p.4)
Measurement of poverty using such a line, and variants of it, is what is attempted below.
Community credibility, the second of the two criteria that have to be met to make a poverty line
acceptable, is precisely what Noble et al seek in their quest for a poverty line based on a
consensual approach. They draw attention to the:
“… pressing need for a carefully thought out relative measure 
of poverty ...”, and they argue “… that a ‘consensual’ or 
‘democratic’ definition of poverty in South Africa is the most 
appropriate approach to help the country overcome the deep 
social divisions that are apartheid’s legacy and become a more 
equal and unified society …” (2004, p.4)
There is an interesting tension between this passage, and the reference above in the citation
from the Ravallion and Sen piece about “the choices made by analysts”. In one instance,
technocrats ‘choose’ the poverty measure – in the other, what constitutes poverty is
discovered by consultation. Although it does not follow from this that Ravallion and Sen are
insensitive to the need for consensus on poverty, the contrast between the two positions
highlights the differences between technicians, politicians and the polity. Even if the poverty
lines that are established meet with general acceptance, there can be no guarantee that they
will be deployed by government in a manner that satisfies all concerned. This is because of
the conflicting demands of politicians and programme managers, not to mention the public at
large, a body whose heterogeneity is often the source of strong disagreements. The tensions
between the needs of politicians and programme managers, and their relevance for the
debate on poverty definition and measurement in South Africa are captured by Everatt (2003) 
in an excellent piece of work called “The Politics of Poverty”. It offers a guide through the
complex terrain within which the debate about definitions, and their use (or non-use) in the
design of policies, and the more nebulous business of articulating goals, takes place. Everatt
offers an analysis of the conflicting needs of the two constituencies, and then shows how the
struggle for ownership of the concept of poverty has marginalised the poor. Having just
insisted that the failure to define poverty is not merely academic, he goes on to qualify the
claim by stressing as well, that:39
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39 Everatt’s prose is so spare and economical, and his argument so persuasive, that I shall not attempt to write a
précis of it.
“… we should be realistic: politicians and programme 
managers have opposing needs. The latter require 
specificity, while the former prioritise political above technical 
considerations and prefer opacity to a definition of poverty
eradication that ‘implies … [that] someone else will have to 
forego those resources’. Most poverty experts argue strongly 
that a detailed definition of poverty is a prerequisite for 
appropriate policy selection, but ignore the political realm and 
the balancing act it requires….”
Where poverty specialists are insufficiently sensitive to political considerations, political
analysts pay inadequate attention to the programmatic needs of anti-poverty interventions.
Balancing political and technical considerations is clearly needed.
Whether that would be sufficient (assuming it can be done) to return poverty eradication to its
status as a national priority is questionable. While poverty has been repeatedly redefined and 
an unceasing string of indicators and targets provided, in South Africa its meaning has
suffered a further hollowing out through endless repetition. Poverty and ‘the poorest of the
poor’ have been both undefined since the days of the RDP and ubiquitous in political
discourse. ‘The poorest of the poor’ are invoked by politicians, civil society activists, the
private sector and others as the intended beneficiaries of (and thus justification for) their
every action, from the privatisation of state assets to black economic empowerment to
enhanced social security provision. The unceasing mantra-like invocation of poverty has
drained it of urgency.
"It is not that poverty is meaningless: it has too many
meanings, in the ANC-led alliance and the public service… ”
(Everatt, 2003, pp.89-90)
If an explanation is sought for the absence of clarity on what is required to achieve the MDGs,
it could do worse than to take the argument above as starting point. Promises to achieve this
or that goal can be attractive. The very act of making such promises, however, carries with it
the risk of having to explain why, in the event of the goal not being achieved, government has
‘failed’. The unedifying debate on the extent of job creation in the run-up to this year’s election 
is an example of how unpleasant the recriminations can become, and in this case, there were
not even any specific promises over which to quarrel.40 A promise to halve poverty is a
double-edged sword.
24
40 Unless one wishes to count GEAR’s 400 000 jobs a year that were supposed to be delivered from 2000 onwards
(Friedman, 2004).
Government measurement and monitoring initiatives
On at least three occasions since taking office, the democratic government has
commissioned research, directly or indirectly concerned to measure the extent of poverty
(and inequality) in the country. The final report of the first of these, Poverty and inequality in
South Africa, was completed in 1998 (May et al, 1998a). Next came the Report of the
Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa,
commonly referred to as the Taylor Committee Report (2002). More recently, and not yet in
the public domain,41 is a report on The Social and Economic Impact of South Africa’s Social
Security System, a document prepared by EPRI, the Economic Policy Research Institute
(Samson et al, 2003).
Recognising the urgency of the poverty problem, President Mbeki, while still Deputy
President, commissioned the undertaking of a poverty and inequality review. The final report
(May et al, 1998a), a monumental work, told government much of what it needed to know
about poverty in the early days of democracy in South Africa. The report offered as well, a
comprehensive set of recommendations, which, if carried out in the manner suggested, might 
have taken some of the sting out of the often acrimonious debates about poverty in South
Africa. Aware of the critical importance of monitoring, the report devoted considerable energy
to suggesting ways in which this could be carried out.42 These recommendations were
accepted by the then Minister of Welfare and Population Development (now the Department
of Social Development), Ms Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi.43 Like many other government
departments, Social Development has been a little slow in implementing the
recommendations on monitoring and evaluation that would make thorough analysis of the
impact of its anti-poverty programmes (chiefly, but not exclusively social security grants)
possible. This, however, as will be seen below, is changing.
Having examined South Africa’s conditions through the prisms of most of the standard
poverty measures, and having commented on the essentially arbitrary nature, in varying
degrees, of all poverty lines, May et al, following the RDP (Reconstruction and Development
Programme), described the bottom 40 per cent households as ‘poor’ (monthly adult
equivalent expenditure of less than R352.23 in 1995). The bottom 20 per cent of households
(where expenditure was less than R193.77 per adult equivalent) was described as
‘ultra-poor’. A little under 50 per cent of the population (about 19 million people) fell into the
‘poor’ category’, while the ultra-poor (about 27 per cent of the population) numbered about
ten million (May et al, 1998a, p.27).
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41 A copy of this report came into my possession because I was asked by the Department of Social Development,
commissioners of the research, to act a reviewer.
42 See especially Section 76 (pp.277) in the main report. The PIR’s conclusion in the Summary report in the section
on the strategy for the reduction of poverty and inequality, that the: “Collection of social, economic and
demographic information to monitor the extent and nature of change is a priority in managing the reduction of
poverty and inequality.” (see May et al, 1998b, Section 10.8) has not been treated with the urgency that it
deserved.
43 Ms Fraser-Moleketi acknowledged that: “… much work still needs to be done to develop the appropriate poverty
measurement tools by Government.” (1998, p.2)
Chapter 5 of the Taylor Committee Report is devoted to an examination of the impact of
existing and proposed (especially the Basic Income Grant, BIG) social policies on poverty.
Figure 10 (on p.60) provides a graphic illustration of the numbers still in poverty (below a
poverty line of about R400 per person in 1999 prices) assuming full take-up of existing social
security benefits. Figure 11 (on p.63) superimposes on the Figure 10 results, the impact of a
BIG of R100 per month, while Table 3 (also on p.63) gives figures for the headcount and
poverty gap reductions of moving from actual to full take-up of existing policies, and of the
adoption of a BIG.
Much of the work for the poverty chapter in the Taylor Committee Report was done by EPRI.
The fruits of this are to be seen in EPRI’s latest work for the Department of Social
Development, the draft report referred above (Samson et al, 2003). Since the report has not
yet been released, its findings may not be cited. Suffice it to say, however, that it delves
deeply into the question of the construction of subsistence type poverty lines, performing
simulations on the basis of a wide range of them. These examine the impact of existing and
planned social grants on poverty (both headcounts and poverty gaps, the latter measured in
three separate ways). With this report in hand, government will have some of the information
required to make informed judgements about the extent to which its policies make possible
the meeting of the MDGs.
Perhaps because it lacked the sort of information provided by Samson et al (2003), and
possibly because the target date is so far in the future, the South African government, until
recently, showed little sign of having applied its collective mind to the question of whether
existing and proposed anti-poverty policies will enable it to meet the goal of halving poverty by 
2014. That has started to change. Statistics South Africa has taken the first of the steps
necessary for the performance of such an evaluation, the construction of poverty lines that
define the levels of consumption that separate the poor from the rest of the population. In the
discussion above on poverty lines, reference was made to what in due course, will probably
become South Africa’s official poverty lines. Although Hoogeveen and Özler (2004), to whom
we owe our knowledge of the existence of the poverty lines, do not describe it as such in so
many words, it appears that a poverty line set at about R174 per person in 2000 is to be the
line marking off the absolutely poor. The document in which the derivation of this poverty line,
and its slightly more generous counterparts for identifying the ‘merely’ poor44 as opposed to
the destitute, is explained (Babita et al, 2003), has not yet been made available for public
scrutiny. Government will not have complied with the Copenhagen injunction until such time
as the paper is released, and its contents have been found not wanting (i.e., it must be shown
to have both scientific integrity and community credibility).45
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44 The use of the word ‘merely’ is not intended to detract from the misery of poverty experienced by many whose
expenditure levels exceed the boundary marking them off from the absolutely poor. One is tempted to use the
expression ‘relatively’ poor to describe the condition. This is not appropriate, however, because the concept of
‘relative’ poverty is already used to mean something quite different.
45 Apparently the Cabinet social cluster requested the Department of Social Development to take the lead, with
Statistics South Africa, in developing the poverty lines. It is not known if the Babita et al effort is the outcome. It was
also rumoured that the National Treasury had, independently, commissioned an academic study whose goal it
would be to construct a set of poverty lines. If this is so, it is much to be deplored. A single, joint effort by the
departments concerned would be preferable.
Establishing what absolute poverty means is, however, merely the start. Rigorous research
into the social wage is also long overdue. The Department of Social Development has made
a good start with the commissioning of the report by Samson et al (2003) into the social and
economic impact of the country’s social security system. That investigation is, however,
limited to social grants. Much more work is required before the effects on the poor of the very
wide range of anti-poverty interventions initiated by the state can be ascertained. In his
Budget Speech to Parliament on 3rd June 2004, the Minister of Social Development said that:
“As part of the provision of basic social assistance services we 
will do further work to improve the understanding of the composition,
value, distribution and targeting of the social wage. We will report 
to Cabinet on this matter by November 2004.”
This study, according Dr Yasmin Dada-Jones of the Presidency, is supposed to cover all
components of the social wage.46  As is well known from the international literature, valuing
publicly provided goods and services is extremely difficult. No satisfactory methodology for
doing so exists. The benefit incidence (supply side) approach can lead to the kind of
nonsense published in the Ten Year Review about dramatic falls in inequality (see below),
while the ‘behavioural’ (demand side) starves in a “dataless void” (Cornes, 1995, p.88). It will
be interesting to see how the problems of valuing the social wage are tackled.
Some progress on monitoring and evaluation appears to have been made, although just how
much, remains to be seen. In his 2004 Budget Speech, the Minister of Social Development
also said that:
“… the Department of Social Development, Stats SA and 
The Presidency have commissioned research to audit poverty 
measures used by different departments. The final report 
and recommendations on poverty measures will be ready 
by September 2004.”
It is not entirely clear what this means. The research could be a follow-up to that done for the
report on monitoring and evaluation of anti-poverty programmes in 15 government
departments, commissioned by the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG,
2001). Attention was drawn in that report to the non-uniformity, and in the case of seven of the 
departments concerned, the absence of definitions of poverty (DPLG, 2001, pp.13-14;
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46 Remarks made at the Treasury/World Bank workshop on poverty in Pretoria, 28th – 29th June 2004. The work is
apparently to be carried out by the HSRC.
Everatt, 2003, p.86).47  The authors of the DPLG report use the ‘cart-before-horse’ metaphor
to describe the (then existing) practice of defining poverty in relation to anti-poverty
programmes (para. 23).48  Although one would hope that matters have improved since the
DPLG report was published, the poor quality of the information on the social wage in the Ten
Year Review does not encourage the belief that such improvements are widespread.
Government’s response to claims of rising poverty and inequality
Alarmed at persistent claims in the media that poverty was on the increase, government has
gone on the offensive against poverty studies that do not take into account the ‘social wage’.49
Government’s attempt to deal with the social wage problem is, however, far from satisfactory.
The basis of the challenge made by government against the ‘rising poverty and inequality
story’ is a set of studies undertaken for the report on the decade of democracy, the Ten Year
Review (PCAS, 2003). Although government’s criticism of existing poverty studies in South
Africa is useful insofar as it has stimulated research into the impact of the social wage on the
welfare of the poor, the published figures in the Ten Year Review have given rise to confusion. 
If the Ten Year Review does represent the most recent thinking of the South African
government on the extent of the poverty problem, then the consideration of what the poverty
reduction goal might be, begins with the statement that in 1995:
“According [to] Statistics South Africa, it is estimated that
approximately 28% of households and 48% of the population
were living below the estimated poverty line – calculated on 
the basis of expenditure, thus excluding access to services
and assets. In 1999, there were 3.7 million such households 
out of 11.4 million (just under 33%) living below the poverty line. 
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47 The DPLG report is as generous with its praise as it is with its criticisms.  The latter are revealing.  The report refers
to the “silo culture” (para. 43), and to the “fragmentation, overlap and lack of communication or co-ordination
amongst (and often within) Departments, even those that are ostensibly doing similar types of things ” (para 45). 
Further on it is said that “The majority of respondents reported that monitoring was either not going very well or that
it was acceptable in places.  Less than a third of respondents reported that they were happy with their monitoring
system.  Again, readers should note the difference between the responses of M&E officials and those of Chief
Directors.  The latter tended to regard current M&E performance as partially acceptable, compared to M&E
officials who felt more strongly that performance was either going well or going badly and avoided the middle
ground.  This indicates the closer contact which M&E officials have with the practicalities of managing monitoring
and evaluation.” (para.59)
48 The ‘government’s programme of action’ webpage notes that a study described as ‘Poverty Measures-Research
to audit poverty measures used by different departments’ has been commissioned by the Presidency. Under the
heading ‘Progress’ is stated “To be completed by August 2004”. Extracted from
www.info.gov.sa/issues/poa/index.html Site visited on 19th September 2004.
49 The failure of existing poverty studies to do so, as we noted above, added one more problem to the others
discussed above (the failure to base measurement on adequate conceptualisation and definition, and the severe
data problems). The problem is by no means unique to South Africa. Saunders (1998, pp.8ff) discusses the
challenges posed for the measurement of poverty in Australia by increases in the value of the social wage. He
notes that the practical problems involved in broadening the income concept (as is attempted in the present study)
would be considerable.
Of these, most were Africans. Part of this increase in income 
poverty would be due to large-sized poor households 
unbundling into smaller households. The unbundling has the 
effect of removing additional income earners from the household 
and would therefore reflect an increasing number of households 
being classified as poor …”50 (PCAS, 2003, p.17, Emphasis added).
Elsewhere in the Ten Year Review, the indicator for income poverty is said to be the
“Percentage below minimum living level (defined in terms of expenditure)” (PCAS, 2003,
p.119). It is not clear what this is supposed to mean. A poverty measure with the name of the
‘minimum living level’ is estimated by the Bureau for Market Research in the University of
South Africa (UNISA). Available only to subscribers (mainly businesses, presumably
interested to know how far their wages are from starvation level), this surely cannot be the
measure chosen by the state to disclose the extent of income poverty.
The phrase in italics in the passage cited immediately signals the likelihood of what promises
to be a major debate about the extent to which the ‘social wage’ has reduced poverty (Meth,
2004). If the outrageous claims in the Ten Year Review about the reduction in inequality
brought about by the social wage were to be believed, all existing estimates of income
poverty would have to be called into question. The impact of social spending in 1997 was an
alleged reduction in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, from a “pre-social transfer
value” of 0.68 to 0.44. By the year 2000, pre-social transfer inequality is asserted to have
fallen to 0.59. Social spending, it is claimed, reduces this to 0.35 (PCAS, 2003, pp.90ff).51
What this means for income poverty is not explained. I have argued that these results are
fundamentally flawed, resulting as they do from the careless application of the benefit
incidence measurement technique to social spending (Meth, 2004). It should be a relatively
simple matter, given adequate administrative records, to determine the (first round)
distributional impact of social grants (tax incidence studies are a lot harder to perform).
Valuing the services that constitute a large proportion of social spending, (e.g., health and
education) is another matter altogether. An important part of the cause of the huge drops in
inequality reported above is the imputation of shares of the total costs of production of
government services to the different deciles of the income distribution. By doing so, the
analyst responsible for them has fallen into the trap of conflating these results with the values
that would be placed upon them by those ‘consuming’ the services. As Demery (2000) points
out, although the benefit incidence technique allows:
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50 Evidence for the assertion that ‘additional income’ earners are removed from households in this process is not
given. Those removed could well have been unemployed persons whom households could no longer afford to
support. The ‘social transition’ to smaller households is discussed on pp.95-96 of the Ten Year Review. The
reasons put forward include declining fertility rates and family sises, as well as “… the effect of new government
policy on how citisens try to access services, encouraging “unbundling” … ”  The housing subsidy is rumoured to
be the ‘service’ that most encourages ‘unbundling’.
51 The Gini coefficients are said to be respectively for “Pre-transfer income share” and “Income share after social
spending” (2003, p.91).
“…benefit flows to recipients of government services [to be] 
distinguished from the income flows government spending 
generates to the providers of those services and other 
government administrators…”
This cannot be taken to imply that:
“… benefit incidence analysis is an accurate tool for measuring 
benefits to service recipients. Perhaps a better term to
describe the technique is beneficiary incidence since this 
avoids the suggestion that true benefits are measured, but simply 
conveys the message that spending is imputed to the
beneficiaries” (Demery, 2000, p.50).
In place of the meaningless estimates of the impact of the social wage presented in the Ten
Year Review, the present paper offers a set of estimates of the possible impact of the social
wage on the ability of households to consume. These, admittedly rough and ready estimates,
suggest that between 1997 and 2002, the poverty headcount rose, the social wage
notwithstanding (Meth, 2004). The results are sensitive, amongst other things, to the
assumptions underlying them, as are all poverty estimates. Nonetheless, the pre-social wage 
poverty headcounts are not wildly out of line with other estimates of the numbers of poor.52
As we have seen above, the 1995 Copenhagen Programme of Action required each country
to ‘develop a precise definition and assessment of absolute poverty’, preferably by 1996.
South Africa has been tardy in complying. Although as noted above, Statistics South Africa
has worked on this problem, the poverty lines they have estimated lines have not as yet, been 
declared official. In the absence of an official poverty line with which to estimate the number of 
‘absolute poor’, one on which it is possible to begin assessing the magnitude of the task of
halving the proportion of absolute poor, some results from the work referred to above (Meth,
2004) are reproduced below. This makes use of poverty lines similar to those in the as yet
unpublished Statistics South Africa paper (Babita et al, 2003). Before digging into those
results, a small digression through the set of obstacles facing the would-be estimator of
income (or expenditure) poverty levels is necessary.
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52 When it came to guessing at the value to individuals of the social wage, every effort was made to err in a direction
that would maximise this value, thus making it likely that poverty is under- rather than overstated.
Some hazards of poverty measurement
Several well-known obstacles to the production of reliable poverty estimates exist. They are
dealt with in a substantial literature. The brief survey above on the state of poverty studies in
South Africa referred to some of the major problems. The point of this section of the paper is
not to review delve more deeply into the literature, but rather to discuss the way in which
some of these problems affect the South African poverty estimates. These are sensitive to a
wide range of factors. The particular sensitivities dealt with below are the following:
• Poverty lines, in particular, the dollar-a-day rate converted by purchasing power 
parity (PPP), and the differences between per capita and per adult equivalent
poverty lines
• The factors required to yield adult equivalents: the child cost ratio, and the
household economies of scale parameter
• The treatment of means and distributions in surveys that collect expenditure (or
income) data in classes or categories
• The extent of under-reporting of expenditure (or income) in social surveys
• The reliability (consistency) of the surveys from which the basic data are drawn
Poverty lines
It is scarcely original to point out that when estimating poverty levels, the choice of a poverty
line (itself a somewhat arbitrary construct) can have a significant effect on the level of poverty
disclosed by whatever study it is that is being carried out. In the present case, the range of
options open should be relatively small – we are concerned, after all, with the reduction of
absolute poverty, and that has been defined in the Copenhagen Programme of Action.
Absolute poverty, it may be recalled, is said to be:
“… a condition characterised by severe deprivation of basic
human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation
facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends 
not only on income but also on access to social services.”
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Focussing, as is our intention, mainly, but not solely on the income dimension of poverty, an
interest in the absolute poor sends us initially to the MDG, where they are identified as those
living below the dollar-a-day poverty line. Although there are numerous, well-documented
problems associated with this poverty line, not least of them the need to convert it into local
currencies using estimates of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP),53 it is not without its
defenders.54  Chen and Ravallion (2001), re-evaluating the line (first introduced in 1991), in
the light of a re-estimation of PPPs by the World Bank, argue that poverty rates estimated on
the basis of the dollar-a-day (actually, $1.08) must be “conservative” (“… a close
approximation to the poverty line one would expect to find in the poorest country …”) (2001,
p.288).
Having outlined both the general problems with PPP exchange rates, and the specific
problems of ‘PPP indexes used in world poverty counts’, Deaton (2003a, pp.357-361)
nevertheless proposes the use of the Chen and Ravallion (2001) PPP poverty lines as a
starting point for monitoring poverty. This suggestion, he argues: “… recognizes the rhetorical 
value of the $1-a-day concept, retaining the trademark.”  Noting the arbitrariness of poverty
lines, he goes on to say that:
“The hope is that within that range of arbitrariness, we can find a 
poverty line for each country that is: (a) close to $1-a-day at 1993
PPP, and (b) meaningful and that makes sense to people in the 
country for the purpose of the international (not domestic) counts”.
(Deaton, 2003a, p.362)
Countries not included in the ‘benchmark’ sample have PPP exchange rates imputed
them by:
“… a regression procedure that effectively adjusts their official
exchange rate by an amount that is similar to the adjustment for 
countries at a similar level of development for which benchmark 
data exist. This procedure, while clearly sensible, can also be 
subject to substantial error, and in some extreme cases in the past,
the Bank has published PPPs and associated poverty rates that were 
clearly incorrect.” (Deaton, 2003a, p.360)
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53 Rao refers to two of the more prominent works highlighting such problems, those by Deaton (2000) and Reddy and 
Pogge (2002), then provides a summary of the major weaknesses (Rao, 2003, p.2). He cites a passage from a
response by Ravallion (2000) to the effect that in:
“the vast bulk of Bank’s analytic and operational work on poverty, the ‘$/day” line is 
ignored, and with good reason. When one works on poverty in a given country, or 
region, one naturally tries to use a definition of poverty appropriate to that setting.
Most of the time, the Bank’s poverty analysts don’t need to know what the local
poverty line is worth in international currency at purchasing power parity ...”
54 It would be naïve to think that the specification of the dollar-a-day poverty line as the international standard in the
MDG would enable controversy over the extent of poverty to be avoided. The call for each country to develop its
own poverty line is an explicit recognition of the fact that although the dollar-a-day line does have some merit, it will
not necessarily be appropriate for every poor country.
South Africa is not one of the benchmark countries–its PPPs are produced by the regression
method. Adjustments to the PPP rate have had some strange effects on the $1-a-day rate
when expressed in Rand terms. Woolard (2002, p.1) notes that the pre-1993 PPPs yielded a
poverty line of R92 per month in 1993. The newly benchmarked figures reduced this to R55
(both in 1993 prices). According to Ahmad (2003?, Annex B, p.25), South Africa’s 1993 PPP
exchange rate (units of local currency per US $) was 1.672. This gives a dollar-a-day poverty
line of R50.86 in 1993. Inflating this to the prices of the year 2002 using the very low income
CPI as inflator, yields an amount of R103.88, or R3.42 per day.55  Deaton (1997, p.157) used
as poverty line, an amount of R105 per person per day in 1993, noting as he did that it was “… 
much lower than poverty lines commonly day …”56  Inflating this poverty line to 2002 prices
produces a figure of R214.48, or about R7.05 per day.57  Because the consumption level it
yields is so far below any poverty line in use in South Africa (and because it does not have its
origins in a benchmark study) there would seem to be little further use that can be made of the
PPP adjusted dollar-a-day line. It is, however, used below to illustrate the argument about the
sensitivity of poverty estimates to the choice of poverty line.
A characteristic of the dollar-a-day poverty line (both the PPP version and the Deaton 1997
version above) is that they are per capita lines (as opposed to per adult equivalent lines). In
the paper in which the dollar-a-day line was originally mooted (Ravallion, Datt and van de
Walle, 1991), the poverty lines measure consumption per person (based on ‘average
families’).58  Apart from the problems inherent in working with such a nebulous concept as the
‘average family’, it is clear that poverty lines measured in this way (per capita) embody implicit
values of the child cost ratio and the household economies of scale parameter. If these could
be estimated, it should be possible to estimate the corresponding per adult equivalent
poverty line. For a given per capita poverty line, the existence of reduced child costs, and the
presence of household economies of scale, have the effect of raising the per adult equivalent
poverty line.59  First prize in the poverty measurement stakes would be an accurate per adult
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55 Hoogeveen and Ösler estimate the value of the dollar-a-day line at R87 in the year 2000 (2004 p.9). Raised to
2002 prices, this would equal R104.5, reassuringly close to the figure of R103.88 referred to above. They observe
that their $2/day line (R174) is close to Deaton’s (1997) of R105 in 1993 (R178.46 in 2000). Their $2/day line they
treat as an “extreme” poverty line. It corresponds roughly to what is described as absolute poverty ($1/day) above.
The difference must be accounted for by the PPP exchange rate conversion.
56 Deaton’s estimate of the headcount ratio (P0) for the year 1993 puts it at 0.25 or 25 per cent of the total population
(1997, Table 3.4, p.157). The World Bank’s estimate for the number of people below the $1/day line in the same
year was 11.5 per cent. See World Bank, 2001, Table 4, p.281.
57 It has not been possible to replicate this figure. An explanation of the method of construction will be sought from
the authors.
58 Ravallion, Datt and van de Walle observe that: “When poverty lines are differentiated by family (sic) sise we have
used the per capita value at roughly average family sise.” (1991, p.347)
59 A household budget, for an ‘average family’ of, say, four persons (two adults and two children) would be $4 per
day. Rather obviously, scaling this for child costs and household economies of scale yields a number of adult
equivalents smaller than the number of persons in the ‘family’. Dividing by the daily budget by this number yields
an adult equivalent poverty line that is smaller than the per capita poverty line. In a two-adult, two-child household
for example, to estimate per adult equivalent consumption, instead of dividing the expenditure level by 4.0 as one
would to obtain per capita consumption, one divides it by 2.69 if á = 0.5 and è = 0.9.
equivalent poverty line. Such a measure is invariant to changes in household (and
demographic) structures–coping with the social transitions experienced in South Africa in
recent times (increasing proportions of single and two-adult households, falling household
sizes generally) would present no problems. The errors involved in using per capita poverty
measures are not easy to estimate. The problem with per adult equivalent poverty lines, of
course, is precisely that child cost ratios and household economies of scale parameters are
extremely difficult to determine.60
For the purposes of the present paper, the income (and expenditure) dimension of absolute
poverty in South Africa follows Deaton (1997)—the absolutely poor are assumed to be all of
those whose expenditure was less than R214.48 per month per person in 2002. In line with
Woolard and Leibbrandt’s suggested use of two poverty lines to create a “… ‘poverty critical
range’ ” (2001, p.49), we turn to a measure suggested by Chen and Ravallion to capture
relative poverty. They argue that:
“… to be deemed “not poor” a person must meet both the 
“$1 per day” absolute consumption standard and consume more 
than some constant proportion of the mean consumption in the 
country of residence. We set the constant of proportionality to
avoid social exclusion61 at one third … ” (2001, p.294, emphasis 
in original)
In South Africa in 2002, mean monthly per capita consumption was about R1267, 62 one third
of this is about R422. It follows that if that level of consumption is regarded as modest, leaving
as it will do, most of those below it, and many above, far from being to able to participate fully
in society, that the MDG goal itself, although laudable, is itself extremely modest. The poverty
critical range in 2002 used in this study requires that people consume between R214-42263
per month. The lower figure separates the absolutely poor from the poor, while the higher
separates the poor from the non-poor.
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60 The topic of converting per capita poverty lines to per adult equivalent poverty lines is dealt with in greater length in
Meth (2004).
61 The concept of social exclusion is contested. Arguing against the uncritical transportation of such terms from First
World debates into the developing country context, du Toit (2004) prefers the term ‘adverse incorporation’ to
describe the conditions of many of the working poor whose mean monthly consumption would certainly lie well
below the R422 mark.
62 Estimated from the South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, March 2004, p.S-119.
63 Expressed in 2002 prices, Hoogeveen’s and Özler’s lower bound poverty line of R322 in 2000 prices would
amount to about R387 per month. This is not all that far from the suggested Chen and Ravallion (2001) figure of
R422 per month (in 2002 prices).
To place these figures in perspective, one of the more ‘commonly discussed’64 poverty lines in 
South Africa, Potgieter’s Household Subsistence Level (HSL), in its adult equivalent form,
would have had a value of about R557 per month in 2002 if what Woolard and Leibbrandt
(2001, p.54) describe as the “widely accepted” (May et al, 1995) scales, i.e., a child cost ratio
of 0.5, and an economies of scale parameter of 0.9,65 were used to obtain the numbers of
adult equivalents. Converting this to a per capita measure (by setting the child cost ratio and
household economies of scale parameter to unity) would yield a poverty line of R344 per
month. This is more modest than both the Hoogeveen and Özler line (R387), and the Chen
and Ravallion line (R422).
Each of the three Poverty Line Sets contains six poverty lines. Presenting the results for all of
them has the advantage of showing how the numbers in poverty change as the level of the
poverty line changes. The interest of the paper is, however, focused on a limited number from
each set. Most important, in Poverty Line Set No. 1, given the extent of deprivation it
represents, (and given the MDG commitment), is the line measuring absolute poverty, taken
here as R214 per capita per month in 2002. Next is the line derived from Chen and Ravallion’s
work, of R422 per capita per month. Falling between these are the scaled HSL 1 and ‘Official’
poverty lines. We look in passing at the poor unfortunates located below the R104 per month
line, being careful not to suggest that this line has any validity as a poverty line. Poverty Line
Sets Nos. 2 and 3 contain a series of scaled variants on the dollar-a-day line (the ‘Deaton’
version), the Chen line and the ‘Official’ line, in which household composition is allowed to
vary between two adults and two children, or two adults and three children. The primary
focus, however, is on the two per adult equivalent variants of the HSL, HSL 1 and HSL 2.
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64 Alderman et al (2000, p.11n) used a figure of R800 per month in 1995 as a cut-off to identify households in poverty,
and a figure of R250 per month for individuals. Their poverty estimates (the 28 per cent of households and 48 per
cent of individuals cited in the Ten Year Review), are not adjusted for child costs or household economies of scale
(p.10n). Hirschowits et al (2000, p.59) describe as “very poor” households with a total expenditure of less than
R600 per month in 1995. Households in which expenditure was between R601 and R1000 per month were
regarded as “poor”. These are respectively, households in the bottom and second from bottom quintiles in the
distribution. It is not obvious from the studies in question how the problem of varying household composition was
treated.
65 The equivalence scale is of the standard form E = (A + áK)è, where E = the number of adult equivalents, A =
number of adults, á = the child cost ratio, K = number of children, and è the household economies of scale factor
(Leibbrandt, Woolard and Bhorat, 2001, p40). Children in this study are treated as those under the age of 18 years.
The process by means of which the values of this poverty line are estimated are described in Meth, 2004, in the
section of the paper headed “Defending the chosen poverty line(s)”.
Child cost ratios and household economies of scale parameters
In the model from which the results presented in this paper are extracted, children are
‘converted’ to adult equivalents66 by the application of a child cost ratio of whatever level is
deemed appropriate. Similarly, the household economies of scale parameters may assume
any value between unity and zero. Setting the child cost ratio at 1.0 implies that the cost of
living for a child is the same as that of an adult, while a household economies of scale
parameter of 1.0 implies that there are no economies of scale. These, obviously, are the
values for per capita poverty lines such as the dollar-a-day poverty line. A rough indication of
the effect of the presence of ‘non-average families’ may be obtained by allowing child cost
ratios to vary between 0.5 to 1.0, while household economies of scale parameters float
between 0.8 and 1.0.
Changing either or both of the coefficients á (the child cost ratio), and è (the household
economies of scale factor) is tantamount to changing the level of the corresponding per
capita poverty line. When that happens, poverty estimates are affected. Woolard and
Leibbrandt (2001, pp.53ff) have demonstrated that poverty headcounts are relatively
insensitive to changes in á and è when poverty lines themselves are relatively high. As the
value of a poverty line declines, say, towards bare subsistence, the sensitivity of the poverty
estimates to changes in the level of the poverty line increases.67 Whatever their
shortcomings, the most common per adult equivalent poverty lines in South Africa, the HSLs,
are based in surveys conducted over a number of years. Since data on child costs, and
implicitly, on household economies of scale, are available, the effects of varying household
composition can be simulated. The same cannot be said of the most important of the per
capita poverty lines mooted above.68 The sensitivity of the Deaton (1997) R105 line (which
converts to R214 per capita in 2002 prices) to changes in the composition of whatever
‘average family’ (or household) it is based on cannot be established (i.e., the implicit values of
á and è cannot be determined). There have been significant changes in household
composition over the period in which we are interested (1997-2002).69  The use of the same
value for the poverty line in each year could thus lead to significant error. Until such time as an 
official poverty line that meets the ‘scientific integrity and community credibility’ criteria is
created, the range within which the ‘true’ headcount of poverty might lie, must remain
unknown. History will continue to be difficult to write because such a line (or lines) did not
exist in the past.
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66 See Woolard and Leibbrandt (2001, pp.50-51) for a discussion on adult equivalents.
67 For want of a better name, I call this phenomenon ‘headcount elasticity’ (see Meth, 2004).
68 The Chen and Ravallion ‘one third of mean consumption figure’ is purely arbitrary, so can be ignored.
69 Between 1997 and 2002, the proportion of households containing a single individual rose from 2.7 to 7.0 per cent;
households containing two adults from 4.5 to 5.8 per cent, while the proportion of households containing adults
and children fell from 87.1 to 82.5 per cent. Within the latter households, the ratio of adults to children appears to
have risen from about 92.3 to about 96.6 adults per 100 children.
Means and distributions within each expenditure category
With the exception of the year 1997, the OHS and LFS data on which the results in the paper
are based do not allow means and distributions within expenditure categories to be estimated 
with any ease. The 1997 October Household Survey collected point estimates of
consumption. For 1999 and 2002,70 all that is available are the expenditure estimates by
category. For those years, means and distributions have to be guessed at, a tricky process.
To address this problem, distributions of adults and children in the various households were
extracted from the survey data. Households containing only adults have been sorted
(categorised) into those containing one adult; those containing two adults, and those
containing between three and ten adults. Households containing adults and children are
sorted into those containing up to 12 children and six adults (households of the latter
composition or type may exist, but the surveys did not discover any). There are thus 80
possible ‘types’ (household compositions) into which a household could be classified.
Dividing the boundary values of the expenditure categories (R0-399 and R400-799 per
month) by the numbers of people (or adult equivalents) in each household ‘type’, yields
maximum and minimum potential per capita expenditure.
Within each of the household types where expenditure lies between R400-799, maximum
and minimum potential expenditure are fixed by the boundaries (e.g., in a two-adult
household, per capita expenditure must be between R200-399.50). What is not known is the
distribution of individuals within each category. For people in the expenditure range R0-399
per month, in addition to the distribution of individuals within each category being unknown, it
is unreasonable to have R0 as the bottom bound, even though there will have been people
with close to zero expenditure during the survey month. Within each household ‘type’,
expenditure is assumed to be distributed linearly. For the bottom expenditure category, the
lower bound is assumed to be set at 50 per cent of the upper bound, i.e., approximately R200. 
With a linear distribution, mean expenditure within this category (for a household containing a 
single individual) would be about R300 per month, or 75 per cent of the upper bound of
R399.71  In the expenditure category R400-799, a linear distribution obviously yields a mean
that lies at the midpoint of the range, i.e., about R600 per month (for a single individual).
These assumptions treat the effectiveness of anti-poverty policy with generosity, in that they
are likely to understate the number of poor. Point estimates in the 1997 OHS allow for the
examination of actual distributions in each of the 80 expenditure household ‘types’ in the two
expenditure categories. Almost without exception, mean expenditure levels disclosed by the
survey lie well below those predicted by the simple linear distributions that have been
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70 The 1999 data (which are highly suspect) are from the 1999 October Household Survey (OHS). The 2002 data are
from the September 2002 Labour Force Survey (LFS).
71 This assumption is generous. In other runs of the model, I have assumed a lower bound of 30 per cent. This gives
a mean of 65 per cent of the upper bound, a figure that is close to the two-thirds sometimes assumed in poverty
and income distribution studies.
assumed.72  It is possible that the actual distributions of expenditure are log-normal. Given
that point estimates are available for 1997, the data for that year, if used in the computations,
might bring the results closer to the ‘true’ values. The complications that arise for the
modelling exercise as a consequence of the mixture of actual and assumed distributions are,
however, of such a nature as to render the use of assumed distributions for the 1997 figures
acceptable. As we shall see, ignorance of the ‘true’ level of expenditure in each household
probably overwhelms any errors introduced by the use of an assumed distribution for 1997.
Under-reporting of expenditure
Surveys have a reputation for under-reporting income and expenditure.73 Population
censuses do not do all that well either. Discovering the extent to which expenditure has been
under-reported is no simple matter. A recent paper by Deaton (2003b) points to an almost
universal mismatch between survey and national accounts consumption estimates. More
acute in some countries than in others, it can reach spectacular proportions, even in the most
advanced economies. In the United States, the ratio of survey consumption to national
accounts consumption fell from 0.80 in 1984 to 0.64 in 2001 (Deaton, 2003b, p.15). Deaton
claims that apart from extremes, what we have is:
“… some combination of underestimation of poverty
decline, underestimation of a widening in the distribution of
consumption [growing inequality], and overestimation of growth. 
Quantifying the contribution of each is an urgent task for anyone 
interested in growth, poverty and inequality” (Deaton, 2003b, p.17).
Non-response, and the degree of inequality are shown by Deaton to be important in
explaining (part of) the drift between surveys and national accounts figures. Having looked at
the weaknesses in both, he comments that:
“When rich households are less likely to cooperate with the survey
 than poor people, survey-based estimates of consumption will
understate mean consumption, and overstate the fraction of 
people in poverty. The fraction by which consumption is understated
 38 
72 The finding that means lie below mid-points of linear distributions is in line with those reported by Keswell and
Poswell (2002). Most responses in the 1997, 1998 and 1999 OHSs gave categorical (income bracket) estimates.
They devised a technique for dealing with the problem caused by the absence of actual income (point) estimates
from the October Household Surveys and Labour Force Surveys, and their (optional) replacement by estimates
that lie within specified income brackets. Critical of approaches that use the mid-point of an income bracket, these
authors (who prefer to assume a log normal distribution of income) show that the use of the mid-point assumption
overstates true means, leading to over representation of better-off individuals (see their Appendix B, pp.42-43 and
their Figure 1, p.50).
73 If the income and expenditure surveys on which poverty estimates depend are of the ‘recall’ rather than the ‘diary’
type, error can be introduced by virtue of the use of an inappropriate recall period. Both Chen and Ravallion (2001,
p.285n) and Deaton (2003a, p.367) refer to the Indian experience where changing the recall period for food from
30 to seven days almost halved the poverty rate (from 36 to 21 per cent).
will typically be larger the greater is the inequality of consumption. 
Unless consumption inequality is increasing over time, or the 
fraction of non-cooperating households is increasing, 
income-based non-cooperation does not, in and of itself, imply
that the ratio of measured to true consumption is increasing 
over time” (Deaton, 2003b, p.33).
Both non-response, and the degree of inequality conspire to overstate poverty in South Africa
– certainly as far as the most recent IES was concerned, non-compliance among the rich was 
very high.74  Inequality, of course, is still high. Further than that, however, it is extremely hard
to penetrate into South African reality. Rough calculations performed by Prof. Charles
Simkins of the University of the Witwatersrand suggest that both the 1996 Population Census 
and the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey captured only about 60 per cent of estimated
national accounts income.75 Professor Servaas van der Berg of Stellenbosch University
claims that the 1995 IES found 90 per cent of national accounts income,76 while the 2000 IES
could find only 80 per cent of it (see This Day, February 25 2004). To the best of my
knowledge, no-one has yet attempted to perform this operation for the OHSs and LFSs.
Even if an attempt were made, it is unlikely to get anywhere near the heart of the matter.
According to the Ten Year Review (PCAS, 2003, p.91), the bottom 40 per cent of households
received only 6.2 per cent of pre-transfer income. An under-reporting error of 50 per cent,
which would raise their income share to a little over nine per cent of the total, could easily be
accommodated in the reconciliation exercises referred to above, still leaving plenty of slack
for under-reporting errors among the well-to-do. Although it might be possible to discover
whether or not income-based non-cooperation has increased over the period of concern here 
(1997-2002), it cannot be said with any confidence, whether inequality is increasing or not.
The project of reducing the possible margins of under-reporting of expenditure by attempted
reconciliation of national accounts and survey estimates cannot succeed. In short, it is not
possible to say whether the ‘ratio of measured to true consumption is increasing over time’.
The only way out of this predicament is via simulation. The approach adopted here is to
assume that the ratio of mean survey expenditure levels to national accounts consumption
means lies within the range shown in Table 1 in Deaton (2003b). Using the population
weighted figures, and ignoring the anomalous results for sub-Saharan African surveys, the
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74 Under-reporting could, and probably does vary significantly by expenditure category, whether the poor are more
likely than the well-off to understate their expenditure cannot readily be determined.
75 pers. comm.
76 Commenting on the poor quality of the 2000 Income and Expenditure Survey, van der Berg and Louw (2003, p.2)
observe that about 25 per cent of the records are useless, either because recorded expenditure for food is zero, or
because total expenditure and total income differ by more than 30 per cent. van der Berg’s claims on the
reconciliation of the different data sources get some support from Alderman et al (2000), cited by Hirschowitz et al
as having found the IES consumption estimates to “aggregate closely” up to the consumption estimates in the
national accounts (2000, p.55). By itself, however, this does not prove that expenditure is not seriously
under-reported in poor households.
ratio lies between 0.569 (for South Asia) and 0.867 (Middle East). Ratios of this magnitude
would be generated by errors of 70 to 15 per cent respectively.77  Talk of error is, of course,
somewhat misleading, because national accounts estimates themselves are widely believed
to overstate growth rates (Deaton, 2003b, p.34).78  This will have the effect of moderating the
ratio furthest away from unity. In other words, the error is unlikely to be as high as 70 per cent
(the ratio as low as 0.569).
Survey reliability (consistency)
Enough has been said above to raise suspicions about the quality of the data used, at least as 
far as the poverty analysis part of this paper is concerned. Expenditure data become
available in an October Household Survey for the first time in 1996. Because the survey for
that year sampled only 16 000 households (conducting the population census and a full-scale 
OHS in one year would have placed too great a demand on the resources of Statistics South
Africa), the year 1997 has been used as starting point. The data are from a full survey (30 000
households). In the early days of the OHS, the sample frame, for a variety of reasons, was
regarded as deficient. The 1997 figures appear to be reasonably consistent, but questions
have been raised about the 1999 results. By September 2002, Statistics South Africa seemed 
reasonably confident that the sample frame was satisfactory. The September 2002 LFS
results are, however, weighted by the 1996 population census results. This means that the
numbers will probably all change when LFS figures reweighted to the 2001 population
census appear.
The paper by Fedderke et al (2004) looking at inequality in South Africa in the period
1995-2000, and drawing on all available surveys conducted by Statistics South Africa in the
period to do so, concludes that:
“… there is much contradictory evidence that emerges from 
household data on inequality – suggesting that the choice of 
data set is non-trivial …” (2004, p.2)
For what it is worth, the 1997 data seem to behave a lot better than do the corresponding
1999 figures (see their Figure 1 on p.48, and the remarks on the quality of the income
estimates on pp.29-31). Tests in the form of comparisons between the household forms
(proportions of households containing varying numbers of adults, and adults and children)
performed on the basic data do not reveal any wild inconsistencies (Meth, 2004). On those
grounds, it seems reasonable to proceed, always with the thought at the back of the mind that
the 1999 results are probably a bit suspect.
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77 If reported expenditure is, say, R400 per month, a 15 per cent error would mean that actual expenditure is R460
per month. The ratio of reported to actual expenditure is thus 87 per cent.
78 Deaton observes, in making this point, that he knows of no plausible estimate of the sise of the bias.
How bad is poverty in South Africa? Has it already been halved?
The latter question, the answer to which is an unequivocal negative, was suggested by the
title of a paper referred to in Deaton (2003a, p.378).79  It arises because some of the results to
be presented below suggest that while the goal has not already been achieved, with a greater 
effort by government, it possibly could be. The trick is performed by allowing the poverty line
to sink towards the PPP based dollar-a-day poverty line. This reductio ad absurdum (the PPP
based dollar-a-day poverty line is manifestly wrong) illustrates the importance of agreeing on
an adequate poverty line to identify the absolutely poor. Allowing the poverty line to move
away from a region of utter destitution soon puts paid to the enticing prospect of a goal well on 
the way to being achieved. It seems likely that the goal of halving poverty by 2014 is so
ambitious that no reasonable hope of achieving it by the designated date should be
entertained. Before looking at poverty at the PPP based dollar-a-day poverty line, however, a
few words about the social wage are in order.
Estimates of the impact of the social wage on consumption are from Meth (2004). That paper
presents a method valuing the social wage that differs from the two standard approaches,
described, for example, in Demery (2000). It is not the intention to spell out in any detail, the
method by which the estimates are obtained. Suffice it to say that if the social wage is to have
any impact on income poverty, i.e., for it to be ‘bankable’, it must either place income directly
in the hands of the poor (in the form of transfers), or it must reduce the amounts that
households have to spend to achieve a given standard of living. Non-income transfers that
have this effect, work either directly by allowing households to reallocate spending after the
introduction of a component of the social wage, or indirectly, by making socially desirable
goods and services available which households could not previously consume. In effect, this
latter process lowers the poverty line. Apart from income transfers (cash grants such as the
state old age pension and the child support grant), the social wage in South Africa is defined
(pragmatically rather than rigorously) as consisting of half a dozen or so, goods and services.
Free basic allowances of water and electricity, subsidised transport, health care (including
school feeding schemes),80 education, housing and sanitation make up the list. In the paper
from which these results are drawn, the full value of the social wage is assumed to accrue to
each intended beneficiary, i.e., targeting is assumed to be perfect. This assumption is
generous to government’s policy measures, overstating as it almost certainly does, the
impact of anti-poverty policy.
For the most common adult and child household in the bottom expenditure categories
(R0-399 and R400-799 per month), namely, those containing two adults and a child (about
12.7 per cent of households in the former category, and 11.0 per cent in the latter), the social
wage was estimated to be worth about R60 per month per adult equivalent in 2002. For the
next most common households, those containing two adults and two children (about 11.4 and 
9.7 per cent respectively of all adult and child households), the social wage was worth about
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79 The paper is by Ravallion (2002).
80 The major school feeding scheme is part of the Integrated Nutrition Project. The responsibility for carrying out this
programme rests with the national Department of Health.
R58 per month per person. With the bottom boundary of the lower expenditure category
assuming a value of 50 per cent of the upper boundary, maximum pre-social wage potential
consumption at the very bottom end of the expenditure scale for the two-adult, two child
household was a little over R85 per month per person (under-reporting assumed at 70 per
cent). This means that the social wage would have raised potential consumption of these
households by almost 71 per cent. The effect obviously falls as one ascends the expenditure
scale. Even so, at the upper boundary of the bottom expenditure category for the two adult,
two-child household, the social wage raises potential consumption by a hefty 35 per cent.81
There is one more issue to be addressed before we get to the results themselves. For many
households, much of the expenditures on which data is captured in the surveys are made, is
made using income paid out in the form of social grants, chiefly the state old age pension and
the child support grant.82  In earlier versions of the paper, the results referred, somewhat
misleadingly, to estimates of poverty before and after the social wage, when, in fact, they
included the pre-social wage estimates included the substantial amounts paid out in the form
of grants.83  An attempt has been made to correct this shortcoming in the present version.84
The correct way to solve this problem would be to subtract from each household, the values
of pensions (and disability grants, as well as the child support grant in the case of the 2002
figures) received. This would give a ‘true’ pre-social income position. It is not possible to
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81 The settings that produce these values come from the Deaton (1997) poverty line. The child cost ratio and the
household economies of scale parameter are both set at 1.0. The value of the social wage is estimated for
assumed levels of under-reporting of expenditure of both 70 per cent and 15 per cent. Since the value of the social
wage does not change with changing assumptions of the level of under-reporting, the impact of the social wage in
proportional terms if a 15 per cent under-reporting assumption is used, is much larger. At the lower end of the
bottom expenditure category, the social wage for a two-adult, two-child household raises potential consumption by 
more than 100 per cent (from the low base of R57 per person per month). For the two-adult three-child household,
the effect is even greater.
82 The surveys seem do reasonably well at capturing the appropriate numbers of old-age pensioners. Recipients of
child support grants are less well enumerated, so a correction is made when the ‘social wage’ is added in, to
accommodate the under-counting of grants of this type. No attempt has been made to check whether the numbers 
of disability grants (by 2002, the third largest category of cash grant) captured by the surveys match administrative
records of grants paid.
83  It is well-known that the state old age pension has a huge impact on poverty. In defence of the calculations in the
earlier versions of the paper from which the results come, it needs to be pointed out that growth in the numbers of
recipients of pensions over the period under consideration was modest. In April 1997 there were 1.7 million
recipients. By July 2001, this had climbed to 1.9 million, a level it appears to have maintained in 2002. As I have
shown elsewhere (Meth, 2004, Table 1), the real value of the state old age pension fell from R694 to R640 per
month (in 2002 prices) between 1997 and 2002. Real transfers via pension grants probably fell slightly, because
the fall in the real value of the pension more than offset the additional benefits paid out because of the increase in
the number of pensioners. It was argued that if the two effects had neutralised each other, pensions could simply
have been treated as a constant. As it is, the earlier years probably had a slightly higher social wage component
from this source. Ignoring this would have biased the results in a conservative direction, i.e., increases in poverty
would have been understated. Child support grant rollout commenced in earnest in 1999, the number of recipients
in March of that year totalling about 28 000. The CSG replaced the Parent and Child Allowances, of which there
were about 350 000 in 1997 (See SA Statistics 2001, p.6.4). The CSG therefore only became salient for the final
year in the calculations, 2002. Disability grants appear not to have increased in number between 1997 and 2002.
Like the state pension, their real value probably fell. They too, were ignored.
84 The need to make this correction was pointed out to me in discussions with Angus Deaton and Francois
Bourguignon at the Treasury/World Bank poverty workshop in Pretoria on 28th-29th June 2004.
perform this trick with the simulation model used in the study from which the results are
drawn.85  As a compromise, it has been assumed that pensions in 2002, 1999 and 1997 were
equally distributed over all households in the household expenditure categories in which we
are interested, R0-399 and R400-799 per month. Child support grants for the year 2002 were
treated in a similar way. With a minimum of juggling, the model returns values of social grants
roughly equal to administrative record estimates of total payouts.86
So much for the social wage – it is time to look at the results of the simulation exercise
conducted out in the paper ‘What has happened to poverty in South Africa as unemployment
has increased?’ (Meth, 2004). Instead of playing with an endless number of outcomes
produced by varying all major assumptions, the latest version of that paper fixes the least
significant of them (the lower bound of the bottom expenditure category), then presents two
sets of results in which the extent of under-reporting of expenditure is assumed to be either 15 
per cent or 70 per cent.87  Variations in the child cost ratio and the household economies of
scales parameters are explored by switching between poverty line sets. The model offers a
choice between three of these. Those in poverty line set No. 1 are all of the per capita type,
i.e., the child cost ratios and household economies of scale parameters are set equal to unity.
A movement away from unity for these two coefficients generates the per adult equivalent
poverty lines in Sets Nos. 2 and 3.
For convenience, the numbering of the tables in Meth (2004) is retained for the present paper.
That means that it does not have a Table 3. Most of the results are collected in an appendix at
the end of the paper. Three tables numbered 4a, 4b, and 4c present headcounts for the six
poverty lines in each of the three poverty line sets. Table 4a contains, in addition, estimates of
poverty gaps (so does Table 5a). Expenditure under-reporting is set at 15 per cent. A similar
set of tables numbered 5a, 5b, and 5c give the corresponding figures for a 70 per cent
under-reporting error. The values in Tables 4 and 5 are based on the assumption that the
value of the social wage has been correctly estimated. Following this is a set of tables (Tables
6, 7, 8 and 9) containing somewhat more detailed results for four per capita poverty lines
(R214, R344, R387 and R422 per month).   Tables 6 and 9 have three variants each. Tables
6a and 9a, like Tables 4a and 5a, are based on the assumption that the value of the social
wage has been correctly estimated. Tables 6b and 9b are based on the assumption that the
social wage has been under-valued in the model. To compensate for this, an additional 25 per 
cent has been loaded onto the five components electricity; water; transport; housing, and
health. Tables 6c and 9c make the opposite assumption, namely that these components have 
been over-valued. To take account of this, the values of each of the five social wage
components are reduced by 25 per cent. Table 10 presents similar results for the HSL 1
poverty line (R557 per adult equivalent per month) with a child cost ratio of 0.5 and a
household economies of scale parameter of 0.9. Table 11 (in the text) decomposes the social
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85 The limitation arises from the fact that the expenditure data are presented in categories, rather than as point
estimates. This determines the form of the simulation model.
86 In the model, the grants are subtracted by raising the value of the poverty line in the pre-social wage module.
87 If reported expenditure is R400 per month, an error of 15 per cent suggests a ‘true’ value of R460. An error of 70
per cent suggests a ‘true’ expenditure level of R680 per month.
wage, showing the effects of each component on the poverty headcount. It also gives the
approximate values of the transfers attributable to each of the components.
Before commencing the analysis in earnest, let us glance at the tantalising prospect raised in
the heading of this section of the paper, namely the possibility that absolute poverty has
already been halved by the social wage. Tables 4a and 5a illustrate a simple and rather
obvious point – the lower the ‘official’ line demarcating absolute poverty, the greater the
likelihood of the ‘bankable’ component of the social wage enabling the MD poverty reduction
goal to be met with apparent ease. At very low expenditure levels, even though the value of
the bankable components of the social wage is, itself, quite low (about R58-60 per person), it
is capable of lifting large numbers of people above the poverty line. If it were assumed that the 
PPP $1/day line were correct, then the post-social wage headcount of people in absolute
poverty could have fallen from 6.8 million in 1997 to 2.9 million in 2002 (at the 15 per cent
expenditure under-reporting level), or from 2.7 million in 1997 to a mere 700 000 in 2002 (the
70 per cent under-reporting error figures). Expressed as rates, we would have witnessed a
decline from a post-social wage poverty rate of 6.5 per cent in 1997 to 1.5 per cent in 2002 (at
the 70 per cent error level). With a 15 per cent expenditure under-reporting error, the
corresponding figures would have been 16.5 per cent and 6.4 per cent.
The results churned out by the model do not seem to be much out of line with the World
Bank’s figures. According to the 2004 World Development Indicators, in 1995, 7.1 per cent of
South Africa’s population was below the $1/day line, while 23.8 per cent was below the
$2/day line (Table 2.5, p.56). It is not suggested that the South African authorities will attempt,
by sleight of hand, to make poverty disappear through the use of results like those disclosed
above. There is, however, a risk that the poverty figures may be misunderstood. The
Hoogeveen and Özler (2004) paper describes the Deaton (1997) poverty line of R105 in 1993 
(R214 in 2002) as being close the $2/day poverty line.88  If someone takes it into their head to
make any claims about poverty reduction goals based on the $1/day criterion, which is, after
all, the poverty line proposed in the MDG, they would have the (mistaken) authority of the
World Bank on which to rest their case.
Apart from the starvation line of R104 per month (Table 4a), the 15 per cent error lines all
generate pre-social wage poverty headcounts for the year 2002 that lie in the range of 19.6 to
21.8 million. This is so despite the fact that poverty lines range in magnitude from R214 per
month to R684. This Catch-22 situation arises because the assumed under-reporting error is
small. The reward for having collected expenditure information correctly would be a
substantially larger number of poor, especially at the R214 line, than those found with an error 
of 70 per cent. From Table 4a it would appear that the social wage, if it reached its intended
beneficiaries, could have lifted some 3.1 million people above the absolute poverty line of
R214 per month in 2002. The smaller the under-reporting error, the smaller the social wage
effect¯at the 70 per cent error level, the social wage lifts five million people above the line of
absolute poverty. There can be no doubt that the conditions of people subsisting on as little as 
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88 Hoogeveen and Özler  say that “While [the $2/day] poverty line is significantly lower than our preferred poverty line
for South Africa, it is useful for international comparisons, and to describe what has happened to the welfare of
those at bottom end of the distribution.” (2004, p.9)
R214 per month are bad. It therefore matters a great deal whether there were 12.1 million of
them, as one would discover using the 70 per cent under-reporting assumption, or 16.5
million, as would be the case if under-reporting of expenditure were only 15 per cent.
To say that it matters greatly how many poor people there are, and what the extent (the depth)
is of their poverty, is to state the obvious. As long as use is made of LFS data there is no way
of narrowing the ranges of the estimates in Tables 4 and 5. The absence of point estimates for 
consumption (or income), in particular, for the bottom expenditure category, makes a resort to 
guesswork unavoidable. The guess (assumption) that expenditure (income) is distributed in
linear fashion is almost certainly wrong. Made to ensure that poverty is under- rather than
overstated, the scrap of comfort it provides would vanish if the true distribution is (or
approaches) log-normal. Compounding this is the fact that ignorance of the true extent of
under-reporting of expenditure is profound, as is that of the child cost ratios and household
economies of scale parameters. Clearly, there can be no easy answer to the question of how
many people are located in the various expenditure categories below the absolute poverty
line, nor can it be known with any precision how much these numbers have changed over
time.
Returning to the Table 4a results (after that dousing with cold water), we observe, as
expected, that the effect of the social wage at very low income levels is substantial. If the
fragile89 estimates of the numbers at the R104 level in 2002 are to be believed, then more
than 13 million people would have been lifted above this line if they had all received the social
wage at the set of values assumed in the model. The relatively smaller number moving out of
absolute poverty suggests that even after the social wage had been provided, the number of
people stuck in the R104-214 region was still very large. A scan of the results for successive
years shows two things, the first of them being the large increase in the numbers below the
R104 and R214 levels; the second of them being the extent to which the social wage could
have softened the blow that this implies. Assuming effective delivery, and plausibility of the
social wage estimates in the model once again, the 2002 social wage package has a greater
impact than its 1999 or 1997 counterparts. Consisting as it does in the model only of the
old-age pension, its impact in 1997 and 1999 was still substantial, a finding confirmed by
numerous other studies.
Tables 4b and 4c, whose two lowest poverty lines are described as scaled dollar-a-day
equivalents to the R214 per capita line denoting absolute poverty, both find slightly larger
numbers of poor than the per capita line. The differences are, however, not particularly large.
Nor are the differences resulting from assuming that apart from the two adults in the standard
household, there are either two or three children. Similar conclusions hold for the other two
scaled poverty lines, the ‘Official’ and the Chen and Ravallion. In both cases, it does not make 
too much difference whether one assumes that there are two or three children in the standard
household. The same conclusion holds for lines HSL 1 (Table 4b) and HSL 2 (Table 4c). Here, 
the switch to a child cost ratio of 0.8 sees differences emerge between the two sets of pre-
and post-social wage numbers. They are not, however, large.
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89 The numbers are fragile because the distribution of expenditure in the bottom expenditure category cannot be
known with any certainty.
Halving the proportion of ultra-poor, as noted earlier, is a relatively modest target when
compared with the Copenhagen goal of ‘eradicating absolute poverty’. The modesty of this
target is matched by a silence in the Millennium Declaration on the question of targets for
reduction of poverty gaps. The absence of a benchmark makes evaluation of progress
difficult, so in a sense, the discussion on poverty gaps that follows, takes place in a bit of a
vacuum. That does not relieve us, however, of the need to consider the poverty gaps. In any
case, doing so highlights the modesty of the MDG targets. Poverty gap estimates are only
made for the per capita poverty line estimates in Table 4a. As the model presently stands, the
poverty gap estimators are not able to cope with a change from a per capita poverty line (from
Poverty line set No. 1) to per adult equivalent poverty lines (from Poverty line sets Nos. 2 and
3). The intuition that poverty gap estimates prepared by the two different methods should not
differ by too much has, however, been tested on the pre-social wage figures for the bottom
expenditure category (R0-399 per month) for the year 2002 for the R214 poverty line. The
test result is satisfactory.90
Two aspects of the poverty gap results at the foot of Table 4a need to be considered, firstly, its
absolute size, and secondly, the change in the poverty gap over time. As far as the absolute
size is concern, the pre-social wage gap in 2002 grows from R36.6 billion per annum at the
R214 per month level, to R88.3 billion at the R422 level (the Chen and Ravallion line).91  In
absolute terms, the post-social wage figures are very similar – a social wage of about R20
billion per annum in 2002 reduces the gap at the R214 level to R14.6 billion per annum, and at
the R422 level, to R62.5 billion per annum. As one would expect, with increasing numbers of
poor found by higher level poverty lines, the poverty gaps all rise quite substantially. The
post-social wage figures, by contrast, offer one ray of hope amidst a generally gloomy
outlook. At the absolute poverty line of R214 per month, the poverty gap falls quite
substantially (the number of poor has increased at that level, so the severity of poverty has
fallen as well). At higher poverty lines, the gap is roughly stable over time. Since the
headcount increases over time at each level, the implication is that poverty is a little less
severe (if the social wage is received by all of its intended beneficiaries, and if it has been
correctly valued here).
With one exception (to be discussed below), the 70 per cent error figures in Tables 5a, 5b and
5c paint an altogether more optimistic picture of conditions, especially in the end year, 2002.
Focusing on the Table 5a results (those obtained using the per capita poverty lines in Poverty
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90 The calculations may be seen in cells O277:AY340 of worksheet ‘A-02’ in spreadsheet ‘SocialWage-4.xls’. The
per capita method yields a gap of R16.2 billion per annum (cell K313), and the per adult equivalent method, about
R17.2 billion (cell P314).
91 It is perhaps useful to remind ourselves at this point of what the Chen and Ravallion line is supposed to be
measuring.  Admittedly arbitrary, the line seeks to label as 'poor', all those who do not consume more than some
fraction of the mean consumption level for the country as a whole.  The fraction selected is one-third.  The line
represents an attempt to grope towards a measure of the as yet, poorly defined concept of 'social exclusion'.  Its
proximity to the lower bound of what might become South Africa's official poverty line has already been remarked
upon.
The concept of social exclusion is contested.  Arguing against the uncritical transportation of such terms from First
World debates into the developing country context, du Toit (2004) prefers the term 'adverse incorporation' to
describe the conditions of many of the working poor whose mean monthly consumption would certainly lie well
below the R422 mark.
line set No. 1), and comparing them with the corresponding Table 4a results, we observe a
huge difference in the estimates of the numbers down in the starvation category of R104 per
month. Instead of 16 million of these unfortunates in the pre-social wage setting, we find
about 11.2 million people. Post-social wage, the numbers drop below one million (instead of
almost three million with a 15 per cent error). At the Deaton dollar-a-day line (R214 per
month) there are 17.4 million people92 as opposed to 19.6 million. The social wage reduces
these numbers to 12.1 and 16.5 million respectively. The big difference between changes at
the 70 per cent error level and the 15 per cent level presumably results from the concentration 
of people not far below the R214 level. Whatever the explanation, the relief of absolute
poverty (always assuming benefits are reaching their intended recipients) is almost palpable.
With the 70 per cent error assumption, the number of absolutely poor stabilises, yielding as
we shall see when we examine Table 6, a fairly substantial reduction in the poverty rate.
Further up the expenditure scale, the numbers of poor begin to converge. At the R422 level,
the numbers are within a million or so of each other.
Tables 4 and 5 make it possible to visualise upward movement resulting from the social wage.
Consider for a moment Table 5a. In the column containing the pre-social wage headcounts,
we observe that in 2002, the jump from the R214 poverty line to the R344 line (about R130) is
associated with an increase in the number in poverty of 2.9 million. The increase in the
poverty line from R344 to R422 (R78) is associated with an increase in the number of poor of
only 1.1 million. The effect is much more noticeable when the post-social wage figures are
considered. In 2002, the social wage, had it been distributed to every eligible beneficiary,
would have lifted about 5.3 million of them above the absolute poverty line of R214 per month.
By contrast, only 1.4 million are pushed by the social wage into the expenditure category
R344-422. Given the high degree of inequality and the extreme poverty of some large
number of South Africans, this is only to be expected.93
Deciding how many people lie beneath a line drawn arbitrarily in consumption space is not
always a meaningful activity.94  When, however, one is concerned to measure the impact of
policy on a condition as dire as absolute poverty, estimates of the number of poor people
have to be made, willy-nilly. Under these conditions, the sensitivity of the poverty line to
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92 The population in 2002 was about 45.5 million.  If the poverty rate increased slightly between 2000 and 2002, then
the figure of 17.4 million absolutely poor, which yield a pre-social wage poverty rate of 38.3 per cent, would accord
well with Hoogeveen’s and Ösler’s headcount estimate of 0.34 (34 per cent of the population).  See their Table 1,
p.38.
93 The manner in which pensions and child support grants have to be removed from the raw data in order to estimate
pre-social wage expenditure levels (dictated by the nature of the data), makes it difficult to estimate the numbers of 
ultra-poor (those well below the R214 mark) with any precision.  At the R104 mark, for example, there were about
6.4 million people before pensions and the CSG were taken away.  After subtraction, this number rises to 11.2
million.  This is with an expenditure under-reporting assumption of 70 per cent.  Using the 15 per cent assumption,
these totals rise to 11.7 and 16 million respectively.  Somewhere in there lies the ‘true’ number.  Clearly, whatever
its value, it is unacceptably large.
94 Concern is often expressed that a poverty line, a construct of some arbitrariness, unrealistically divides the
population into those who are poor, and those who are not. To a certain extent, poverty headcounts must be
arbitrary. There is a tension between, on the one hand, the need for a benchmark against which to measure
progress (or the lack thereof) in the struggle against poverty, and on the other, the knowledge of the unavoidable
arbitrariness of such benchmarks.
changes in its level begins to assume some importance. At or near a poverty line whose level
is sufficiently ‘generous’, not only are poverty headcounts relatively insensitive to the social
wage; they are also relatively invariant to quite large changes in the assumptions used to
construct the poverty lines. Although still responsive to changes in the (assumed) extent of
under-reporting of expenditure, they do not display anything like the sensitivity to variation in
under-reporting that is visible lower down the expenditure scale. This relationship may be
expressed in the familiar terms of an elasticity (I have called it the headcount elasticity). If the
percentage change in the number of people is divided by the percentage change in the level
of the poverty line in each case, one finds that it has a value of 0.81 for the change from R214
to R344, and a value of 0.34 for the change from R344 to R422. For relatively ‘high’ poverty
line levels, this curiosity is not of much consequence (or interest). As far as absolute poverty
is concerned, however, it is a useful reminder of the need for caution in the interpretation of
results (an important part of the assessment of the success or otherwise of government’s
anti-poverty policies).
Reference has been made above to the finding from the sensitivity tests on poverty lines
conducted by Woolard and Leibbrandt (2001).95  At the ‘high’ poverty line levels with which
they worked, they found that headcounts were fairly insensitive to comparatively large
changes in poverty line levels. The finding that this is not the case at low levels, such as the
absolute poverty line tested in Tables 4a and 5a, highlights the importance of agreeing on a
line, and then maintaining it in good condition during the period for which it is supposed to
function as benchmark indicator. Maintenance of the line (it may be necessary to have more
than one, say for rural and urban conditions) requires that careful attention be paid to
selection of deflators.
At the foot of Table 5a (as is done in Table 4a), the poverty gap estimates are presented.
Looking once more at the two aspects of the gap that are of concern here, it may be seen that
at the R214 level, the pre-social wage gap was R26 billion per annum in 2002. This increases
to R74.3 billion at the R422 level. As is the case with Table 4a figures, the post-social wage
poverty gaps provide some light in the gloom. The social wage pushes the R214 gap from
R26 billion to R8 billion per annum. Whereas the pre-social wage poverty gap rises (from R16 
billion in 1997 to the aforementioned R26 billion in 2002), the post-social wage poverty gap
appears to fall slightly. Given the apparent fall in the headcount over the time, the severity of
absolute poverty declines over time. What these results suggest is that the social wage lifts
some fairly substantial number of people to a consumption level not far below the R214 line.
Although it seems unlikely that the poverty MDG will be met with existing anti-poverty
policies, the reduction in the severity of poverty is still noteworthy. It must be noted, however,
that for the purposes of reducing absolute poverty, the difference between the Table 4a
post-social wage poverty gap in 2002 and its Table 5a counterpart (R15 billion vs. R8
billion)¯the indicator of the depth of our ignorance of the ‘true’ conditions of the poor¯is very
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95 This is after having tested for a wide range of values of á, the child cost ratio, and è, the household economies of
scale factor, Woolard and Leibbrandt (2001, pp.50-53).  Changes in these two, it will be recalled, changes the level
of the per adult equivalent poverty line.
important. Implications for financing the social wage, should the larger amount have to be
found, are obvious.96
Poverty gaps estimated here differ from those in Bhorat (2001) and Samson et al (2003), but
not by enough to make one lose confidence in the simulation exercise. Bhorat’s (2001, p.160) 
figure for the year 1995 estimates that R12.8 billion (in 1995 prices) would have to reach the
poor each year to eradicate poverty. Inflated to 2002 prices, the requisite amount would be
R22.2 billion. Bhorat uses the HSL 1 poverty line (R293 per month in 1995, which translates
into R557 per month per adult equivalent, or R344 per capita). The Table 5a pre-social wage
poverty gap for 1997 (at the 70 per cent error level) is R37.7, while the post-social wage figure 
is R28.4. Bhorat’s estimates would have included expenditure made using the old age
pension, the most important element of the social wage available in 1995. It is plausible for
the poverty gap to have increased by R6 billion over the two-year period 1995-97. Samson et
al (2004, p.31) using an HSL poverty line, put the 2000 poverty gap at R44.6 excluding grant
income, and R31.8 billion including it. Converted to 2002 prices, these yield poverty gaps of
R53.6 and R38.1 billion respectively. Going to Table 5a once more, we see that the
corresponding 1999 gaps were R38.3 and R29.5. The 2002 pre-social wage figure is R55.6
billion. It does not require much reduction in the under-reporting error assumption level to
bring the estimates in the paper into line with those in the Samson et al piece.
Comparison of the pre- and post-social wage headcount estimates for the R319 poverty lines
in Table 5b, the R271 poverty line in Table 5c with the R214 poverty line figures in Table 5a,
shows (as one would hope) that although converting a per capita poverty line into a per adult
equivalent line (‘scaling’ it), has some effect on the poverty headcount, the effect is not
overwhelming. Changing mean household size pushes the figures out of agreement
(compare the results for poverty lines R283 in Table 5c and R347 in Table 5b with the R214
line in Table 5a). Similar conclusions hold for each of the lines in Tables 5b and 5c when they
are compared with the corresponding lines in Table 5a.
The final feature of the Table 5 results to which attention will be drawn arises from the rapid
fall-off in the effectiveness of the social wage in raising people out of poverty as the level of
monthly per capita expenditure assumed to demarcate the boundary between poverty and
‘non’ poverty increases. To explain this satisfactorily, it is necessary to examine the
distribution of the poor with greater precision. One area possibly deserving closer attention is
the region bounded by the R214 and R344 poverty lines. Unfortunately, doing so requires a
substantial amount of reworking of the model, a task that will have to wait for the next revision
of it. Let us, therefore, turn away from that cul-de-sac to the somewhat more detailed results
in Tables 6 to 10.
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96 Meeting the MDG of halving poverty by 2015 (2014) may be possible, but if underlying forces in the economy exert
the kind of downward pressure of which the 15 per cent error results presented here are the outcome, doing so
becomes increasingly unlikely.
The three versions of Table 6 present the estimates of poverty at the line separating the
absolutely poor from the merely poor (R214 per capita per month).97  One task the three
tables make possible is a consideration of the consequences the value of the social wage not
being correctly estimated. Only one set of figures in each tables is affected by assuming that
the social wage has been over- or under-valued – the post-social wage estimates for 2002.
Comparing headcounts for a 70 per cent expenditure under-estimate error, the zero error
value for 2002 is 12.1 million (the pre-social wage headcount is 17.4 million). If the social
wage has been under-valued by 25 per cent, the post-social wage headcount would fall to
11.3 million. If it had been over-valued by a similar percentage, the pre-social wage
headcount would be 12.9 million. Results for the 15 per cent expenditure under-estimate
error behave similarly. The impact of this on the change between 1997 and 2002 (one of the
outcomes currently in dispute), could be that instead of growing by 700 000 (Table 6a), it
either fell by 100 000 (Table 6b), or grew by 1.5 million (Table 6c). Similarly, the 15 per cent
under-reporting figures suggest that the headcount could have grown by 300 000 (Table 6a),
fallen by 400 000 (Table 6b), or grown by 900 000 (Table 6c).
Pre-social wage estimates, of course, are unaffected by all of this. So, in the absence of the
social wage, the 70 per cent error figures would have the number of poor rising by 3.5 million
between 1997 and 2002. The lower error (15 per cent) sees a smaller increase (1.7 million) in
the headcount (its one bright feature), but to offset this, the initial headcounts are
considerably higher. The impact of the social wage for both error conditions is more or less
dramatic, depending (as ever) on the value of the social wage. Even the most pessimistic
value assigned to the social wage takes the 3.5 million people who would have joined the
ranks of the absolutely poor in the absence of the social wage, and reduces their number to
1.5 million. The more optimistic estimates of the value of the social wage see the number of
absolutely poor falling.
Poverty rates, the critical variable for the poverty reduction goal, behave, as expected – for
zero social wage error, and 70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure error, they fall slightly
(from 27.7 per cent in 1997 to 26.6 per cent in 2002). If the value of the social has been
under-estimated the rate falls to 24.9 per cent in 2002. An over-estimate of its value would
see the rate climbing slightly, to 28.4 per cent. The 15 per cent expenditure under-reporting
error results differ slightly, with falls in the poverty, from a much higher base, registered in
each case. From a 1997 rate of 39.3 per cent, the final figure could be either 36.3 per cent
(zero error), 34.8 per cent (25 per cent under estimate), or 37.6 (25 per cent over estimate).
Poverty gaps, instead of being R8.2 or R14.6 billion per annum, now fall within the ranges of
R7.1-9.4 billion and R12.8-R16.4 billion respectively, depending on whether the social wage
has been over- or under-valued.
The variability of the numbers notwithstanding, if any of the headcounts figures is correct (as
ever, the question of whether or not the benefits went to the most deserving hovers over us),
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97 Note once more that the adjective ‘merely’ when placed before the word ‘poor’ is not intended to suggest that the
condition is anything other than undesirable.
then what can only be described as a major catastrophe will have been averted.98  That much
acknowledged, it is sobering to reflect on the magnitude of the task of halving poverty rates. If
the billions of rands poured into poverty alleviation have only brought down the poverty rate
by between one and three percentage points over five years, then the goal of halving the rate
(starting from high base rates) does not look as though it can be achieved.
Other than reinforcing the common-sense assertion that the social wage, if properly targeted
and delivered, would have had a significant impact on the welfare of those below the line
demarcating absolute poverty, the Table 6 results cannot tell us much. This represents a
turning point in the analysis, forcing as it does, an acknowledgment of the fact that it is not
possible to say with any certainty what has happened to absolute poverty – there are just too
many ‘ifs’ for comfort. Before concluding from this that simulation is a worthless exercise, let
us see what happens as the level of the poverty line is raised.
Pushing up the poverty line to R344 as is done in Table 7 represent a move to the per capita
version of the Potgieter HSL 1 line of R557 per adult equivalent with ‘conventional’ child cost
ratio and household economies of scale parameter of 0.5 and 0.9 respectively. The Table 7
figures assume zero social wage error. The, by now, familiar pattern of larger headcounts,
coupled with smaller changes in headcounts as with the smaller error assumption appears
once more. Headcounts and poverty rates appear to be approaching plateaux from which the 
social wage cannot dislodge them. Under the 70 per cent error assumption, the post-social
wage poverty rate barely changes. The 2002 post-social wage headcount is larger than the
1997 pre-social wage figure. Between those two years, the poverty headcount rises by 1.5
million, the social wage notwithstanding. As before, the 15 per cent error figures show smaller 
headcount increases. The 2002 post-social wage headcount is the same size as the 1997
pre-social wage headcount. Associated with these large headcounts are correspondingly
large poverty gaps. The 2002 post-social wage gap could be between R33-44 billion per
annum.
The Table 10 figures should be read in conjunction with those in Table 7. These two tables,
respectively present the HSL poverty line in its per capita form (R344 per month), and in its
adult equivalent form with a child cost ratio of 0.5 and a household economies of scale
parameter of 0.9 (R557 per month). In its per capita form the social wage appears to reduce
the poverty headcount by a larger amount (1.6 million, as opposed to 1.1 million with a 70 per
cent error). Increases in poverty headcounts over the period are larger when the per adult
equivalent form of the poverty line is used. No simple explanation for why this should be
suggests itself. The differences are not large enough to upset the overall pattern of the
findings. This being so, there is probably some virtue in using per capita poverty measures, if
only because of their simplicity.
The Table 8 figures, using the line that might be adopted as the official lower bound of the
poverty critical range, R387 per capita per month (Table 8), show about 20-21 million people
in poverty. Their number, post-social wage, might have increased by between 400 000 to
800 000 between 1997 and 2002. The social wage causes poverty rates to fall slightly more
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98 It is not pleasant to contemplate the consequences of targeting and delivery being less than perfect.
than they would otherwise have done. The poverty rate is so high (in excess of 40 per cent),
and the rate of decline so low, as to make it seem extremely unlikely that social security policy
in its present form can reduce it to an acceptable level. Poverty gaps spiral, as one would
expect.99
Arrived at the R422, below which Chen and Ravallion suggest social exclusion might lie, we
investigate once more, the impact of assuming that the value of the social wage has not been
correctly estimated. Comparing Tables 9a, 9b and 9c, the first thing to note is that the
increase in the post-social wage poverty headcount between 1997 and 2002 does not
disappear as the assumed level of under- or over-valuation of the social wage is allowed to
vary. If the social wage had been under-valued by 25 per cent, then at the 70 expenditure
under-reporting error level, the number below the line would have grown by about 800 000.
Over-valuation of the social wage by a similar percentage would be associated with a
post-social wage headcount increase of 1.3 billion. Corresponding figures for the 15 per cent
expenditure under-reporting error level would be 300 000 and 600 000.
After taking the social wage (of whatever value) into account, there are still between 19.2 and
20.3 million people below the line. Differences between the three estimates of the post-social
wage poverty rates in 2002 are trivial¯from a low of 42.2 in Table 9b (down from 44.6 in 1997)
to a high of 42.9 in Table 9c. At the 15 per cent expenditure under-reporting error level, the
range is from 45.5 to 44.9 per cent (down from 48.8 per cent in 1997). Post-social wage
poverty gap estimates obviously vary as the assumption about the value of the social wage is
changed. The poverty gaps are so large, however, that these variations are comparatively
small when expressed in percentage terms. At the 70 per cent expenditure under-reporting
level, post-social wage poverty gaps rise between 1997 and 2002 regardless of whether or
not the social wage is assumed to be correctly estimated. At the 15 per cent expenditure
under-reporting level they are either static (Table 9a), they fall slightly (Table 9b), or they rise
slightly (Table 9c). Once more, the variation in percentage terms is quite small.
Unlike results at or near the line of absolute poverty, the results that emerge as the poverty
line is raised begin to look more and more robust. As a corollary, poverty looks more and
more intractable. So, while the simulation exercises that have to be conducted in the face of
data deficiencies cannot tell us much about changes in absolute poverty, it certainly looks as
though the figures have something sensible to say about what happens as the goal of
anti-poverty policy is elevated above just coping with absolute poverty. That something
appears to be the conclusion that the social wage becomes less and less effective. To place
out R422 per capita poverty line in perspective, if it useful to recall Hoogeveen’s and Özler’s
finding that using a basic ‘cost-of-needs’ approach:
“… a reasonable poverty line for South Africa must lie between
322 Rand (lower-bound poverty line) and 593 Rand (upper-bound 
poverty line) per capita in 2000 prices …” (2004, p.9)
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99 In the bottom expenditure category, pre-social wage per capita mean expenditure levels for those living in
households containing adults and children (about 88 per cent of the people in the category) were a tad under R100 
per month.
Converted to 2002 prices, this yields a poverty range of R387  –  R713 per capita per month.
Working our way up from the line of absolute poverty (where findings are ambiguous), we
observe that not long after climbing above the Hoogeveen and Özler lower bound poverty line
(we are nowhere near the upper bound), the results begin to stabilise around the conclusion
that the post-social wage headcount has risen, that the declines in poverty rates are small,
and that poverty gaps are relatively insensitive to substantial variations in the assumed value
of the social wage.100  This inevitably poses the question of how much more the ‘social wage’
can do to lift people out of poverty. With the exception of housing, the model has already
awarded everyone the full social wage. The only augmentation of the social security system
is the proposed extension of the child grant to children under the age of 14 years. Although
this will reduce poverty, there are not enough children in the poorest households to raise
household consumption enough to lift the adults out of poverty.101
It may be worth noting that the results for some variants of the simulations reported on above
suggest a slight improvement in conditions between 1997 and 1999. Where it occurs, it is
made evident by a reduction in the numbers in poverty. So small, however, are most of the
changes, that they are probably not statistically significant. These findings are not too wildly
out of line with the labour market outcomes illustrated in the period. Between 1997 and 1999,
unemployment appears to have risen by about 700 000, using either the official or expanded
definitions. From 1999 to 2002, however, the number of unemployed rose. Using the
expanded definition, the increase was probably in the region of two million.102 Formal
employment declined slightly between 1997 and 1999 (by about 160 000 or so), having hit a
trough in 1998, out of which it climbed slowly but steadily. Informal sector employment
probably increased.103
The final figures to be aired in this brief presentation of the model’s results, give a rough
indication of the impact of changes in the levels of individual components of the social wage
on the numbers of poor. The figures refer to two scenarios: the Deaton dollar-a-day (R214 per 
month), and the Chen and Ravallion R422 line, both in their 70 per cent under-reporting
settings. For convenience, they are collected and presented in Table 11.
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100 Similar results are obtained using the ‘arbitrary’ R600 per capita line in Poverty Line Set No. 1.
101 In the households in expenditure category R0-399 per month, the Child:Adult ratio is 1.095:1.000.
102 Unemployment figures are from Meth (2004).  There is a discontinuity in the estimates caused by the changeover
from the OHS to the LFS.  The figures can, however, be reconciled.  In the first LFS, the reconciliation exercise
suggests that the differences caused by the discontinuity would not be very large, at least for the estimates of
unemployment, if similar definitions were used.
103 A barely plausible increase (given the subsequent behaviour of the series) of almost 800 000 occurs in the number 
of informal sector workers between 1997 and 1999.  With the exception of a strange spike in the series at February
2001, the employment level is roughly constant, something that is as hard to believe as the sudden leaps in
employment levels.  The simple truth is that it is not known what has happened to employment in the informal
sector.
Table 11: Impact of individual components of social wage on poverty
Numbers (1000s) raised above Value of transfer(R billions)
Poverty line R 214 R 422 R 214 R 422
Pensions and
CSG 1710 360 8.8 10.6
Electricity 340 80 0.5 0.9
Water 260 60 0.3 0.7
Transport 270 60 0.4 0.7
Housing (Subsidy) 1150 260 1.7 3.2
Health 1180 130 2.1 3.4
Total - Listed
benefits 4910 950 13.8 19.5
Source: Own calculations in spreadsheet Social Wage-4.xls
A few words of caution are necessary before looking at the figures in Table 11. In the first
place, they are extracted from the zero-error social wage estimates. In the second, the
method used to estimate the values of the transfers is rough and ready, consisting as it does
of the difference between the poverty gaps with and without the benefit under consideration.
Even so, its results appear to be within striking distance of the social security administrative
data. About 57 per cent (R8.6 billion) of the total payout of the R15 billion on old age pensions
accrued to people in the bottom two expenditure categories. The total amount paid out for
child support grants looks as though it would have been in the region of about R3.7 billion. If
about two-thirds of this accrued to people in the bottom two expenditure categories, then the
figure of R10.6 billion as total pension and CSG payout would be roughly correct.104
Having established the pedigree of at least some of the results, we observe that the most
striking of them is the huge number of people lifted out of absolute poverty by the two cash
grants for which verifiable data are readily available; state old age pension and the child
support grant. Next in line are health and housing, whose combined effect is even greater.
Although individually, the other components of the social wage do not have much of an effect
on the numbers in poverty, taken together, they do contribute to the achievement of the
substantial impact the social wage has, if only at the R214 per month mark.
The true extent to which South Africa’s anti-poverty policies have been able to counter
absolute poverty must, however, remain conjectural – data with which to make a more
precise assessment are not available. It seems likely that the anti-poverty measures have
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104 See spreadsheet ‘wklshhofun02b.xls’, worksheet ‘Raw data (Nos)’.
had, as it were, to run simply to stay still.105  The likelihood of even the lowest of the observed
poverty rates being halved by 2014 by social security policy of the existing stripe (the social
wage) is slender.
There are two possible ways in which the values of the transfers that lift people out of poverty
may be increased: one ‘real and the other ‘artificial’. The real method entails increases in the
value of some or all of the components of the social wage. The artificial method requires
corrections in the values of the components of the social wage where these have been
under-estimated. The latter method has already been tried. It is, of course, possible to raise
the error level still higher.106  To examine the impact of the former, anyone so inclined may go
back to the model and insert their own values.
The two areas of greatest promise are health and housing (pensions and child support grants
are, as we have seen, almost fully accounted for). The allowance for health care seems
generous, as does that for housing (scaled in proportion to the number of subsidies granted).
Since we are dealing with income poverty, the poverty reducing capacity of any component of
the social wage is the extent to which it is ‘bankable’, i.e., the extent to which it increases
potential private consumption. As to increases in the value of state expenditure, if the
demographic changes discussed above are real, and not merely an artefact of the data, then
poverty eradication using existing policies is going to become harder. Raising the age of
eligibility for the child support grant will have a substantial effect. Unfortunately, much of this
will bypass households in the bottom expenditure category, where the child:adult ratio is low.
Pensions will grow as the population ages, but once again, the poorest households are poor
precisely because they do not have a pensioner in the household. Further efforts to distribute
more housing subsidies will help, but by enough to make a sizable contribution to the
achievement of the MDG?  Recall now that we are talking here about the absolutely poor – as
the poverty line is raised to reflect a more humane standard of living (still leaving people very 
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105 Our ignorance about the precise numbers of people in absolute poverty – are there 11.3 million such unfortunates,
or are there 17.1 million of them? – is a serious problem. No effort should be spared in designing and implementing
surveys that reduce this ignorance to a minimum. When official statisticians are caught napping by large errors,
they can (and do) take refuge behind the claim that absolute levels do not matter too much as long as trends are
accurately captured. This may be the case (in some instances) for the national accounts – it certainly cannot be
true for poverty estimates. The precise number of poor, and the depth of their poverty matters greatly to the poor,
and should do to policymakers as well.
106 This is easily done in cell B68 of worksheet ‘Front page’ in spreadsheet ‘SocialWage-4SW.xls’.
poor), poverty reduction becomes more difficult.107  The intensity of poverty (the poverty gap)
becomes increasingly important – the greater the gap, the less the impact of the social wage
on poverty levels.
Conclusion: And now, what?
As political rallying cries, commitments to loosely specified goals such as halving
unemployment or halving poverty, have a certain appeal. When social scourges reach
epidemic proportions, as they have in South Africa, the repeated invocation of the promise to
halve one or the other, or both, may be of comfort, if not to those directly affected, then at least 
to those who worry over such things. Unless given greater precision, however, their value as
indicators of what policy is supposed to achieve, is negligible. There is an interesting
similarity between the setting of goals that are at once, too precise and too ambitious, and
goals that by their lack of precision altogether are capable of different interpretations.
Reflecting on the failure of GEAR to deliver economic growth of six per cent per annum and
400 000 jobs a year by 2000, Friedman argues that:
“… raising expectations which cannot be met is not a cost-free
exercise  –  indeed, it risks destroying over time precisely the 
confidence which the over-cheery projections are meant to create.
Just as inflation targeting and Manuel’s precise deficit reduction 
targets always run the risk of eroding confidence by 
setting an over-ambitious government goal and ensuring that failure
to meet it obscures real progress, so, it could be argued, did 
Gear’s growth and job creation targets create unnecessary 
political opposition to government’s current macroeconomic 
strategy by fostering unrealistic expectations of what could be 
achieved by the proposed policy path.”(2004, p.186)
In the absence of clarity over the meaning of the halving unemployment and halving poverty
goals, people are likely to take it into their heads to interpret these goals in particular ways.
What the consequences are of a failure to meet these imagined goals is difficult to say –
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107 For what it is worth, a simulation exercise by Hanmer and Naschold (2003) found it unlikely that the high inequality
sub-Saharan African countries would achieve the poverty halving goal by 2015.  Those among them that switched
to a ‘broader-based’ (more labour intensive) growth path required real average annual per capita growth in GDP of 
3.5 per cent to do so. Countries in which the growth path did not change required a staggering 10.4 per cent per
capita GDP growth to halve poverty (2003, p.269). Optimism about South Africa’s growth prospects is a recurrent
refrain in the popular and financial press.  It is not obvious that this is justified.  Lewis’ (2001) paper put feasible
GDP growth over a decade at about four per cent per annum on average. Even if the population growth rate falls to
say, one-an-a-half per cent per annum, that would still only yield per capita GDP growth of about two-and-a-half
per cent per annum.  Where for Lewis, skills are a major constraint, for Leftwich (2000), the form of the state itself
limits growth possibilities.  He describes South Africa (and Venesuela) as “Class-compromise non-developmental
democracies” (p.182), using the term ‘non-developmental’ to exaggerate the differences in growth possible in
such democracies, and the “dynamic growth achievements of dominant-party and coalition democracies …”
(p.182).  Outlining a number of problems facing class-compromise states, he argues that they illustrate “why,
ceteris paribus, [such states] are likely to have slow and limited developmental rates and why the agreements
comprising these democracies tend to be so conservative in practice” (p.186).
cynicism, frustration and disappointment are some obvious contenders. We have seen
Deaton (2003a) arguing in favour of the use of dollar-a-day poverty line, not because of its
accuracy, but because of its rhetorical nature – it is useful because it has come to be
accepted as a ‘trademark’ of poverty. By analogy, there is probably some merit in using catchy 
slogans as mobilising devices for campaigns such as the attacks on poverty and
unemployment. The question is one of what goals should be formulated.
Considering first the unemployment target, this study has shown that as far as can be
ascertained, neither government nor its social partners appear to have given serious
consideration to what is entailed in the making of such a commitment. Since a choice has not, 
apparently, been made among the possible contenders for halving, no credible estimates of
the numbers involved in such an exercise can be made. The three major variables that
determine the rate of unemployment are:
• The rate of growth of the potential workforce
• The participation rate
• The rate of growth of employment
Over the first of these variables government has little or no control. Participation rates are
affected by social protection policy (the introduction of unemployment benefits, for example,
could encourage people to switch their labour market status from ‘not economically active’ to
‘unemployed’). The rate of growth of employment in the private sector can be influenced
indirectly. Speeding up the rate of job creation beyond the meagre achievement of the past
decade is, however, no simple task. Over employment creation in the public sector,
government has, of course, much greater control. With the exception of the planned
expanded public works programme (EPWP), government’s goal in recent years has been
rather a reduction than an increase in public sector employment levels.
Given (a) the confusion shown to exist in the official statistics about participation rates, (b) the
difficulties of guessing what these are likely to be in the future, and (c) the problem of
guessing, in the face of the AIDS epidemic, the rate of growth of the potential workforce, it is a
difficult matter even to hazard a guess at the number of jobs that would have to be created to
achieve the halving goal. Simulations performed on the somewhat flaky information available
suggest that at best, halving the official rate of unemployment would require their number to
fall by about 1.5 million. To achieve this might require some seven million jobs to be created
between now and the year 2014. Attempting to halve the number of according to the
expanded definition, might demand as many as 11 million new jobs, a tall order.
The sensible thing to do is to re-open the debate, this time with a full set of simulations of
possible outcomes placed before the participants. Only after these have been critically
examined, should consideration be given to the setting of goals. In all likelihood, once the
relevant figures have been scrutinised, the social partners will recognise the futility of
attempting to set goals of this type. Once this is acknowledged, backing away from a
meaningless promise with good grace, will be possible. Enough is known about
unemployment and the variables associated with it, to make possible the early convening of a 
meeting of those most concerned (the people and organisations normally referred to by that
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awful term, the ‘stakeholders’). It should not be difficult to persuade them that a sensible
approach to the unemployment problem would be to agree on an attainable goal, rather than
to engage in pipe-dreaming (as should have been done with GEAR).
Although this is not the place to explore ‘attainable goals ’at any length, it is worth noting that
pointers to the area in which such a goals might lie, are provided by the analysis above, that
suggests which of the variables that determine unemployment levels are most susceptible to
the levers of policy. Obviously, everything that can be done to foster private sector
employment creation should be done. The prospects for success need, however, to be
measured against past performance and realistic assessment of future possibilities rather
than political wishful thinking. As far as public sector employment creation is concerned, the
only growth in jobs is likely to be indirect, resulting from the expanded public works
programme (EPWP).108  Critical analysis conducted by McCord (2004) suggests that the
EPWP, in its present form, is too small to make much of a dent on unemployment.
The insight that participation rates can be influenced by social protection policy should lead
directly to a consideration of forms of social protection that would not have the undesirable
effect present in the example given above, namely, that of stimulating entry into the labour
market merely to claim a social grant. One form of social protection policy that does not exert
such a perverse incentive springs immediately to mind¯the Benefit Transfer Programmes
(BTP) promoted for many years by Dennis Snower (1995a, 1995b). The vouchers he
suggested as an alternative to unemployment benefits could be used to reduce the costs to
employers of providing employment with meaningful training. A South African version of this
could commence by introducing a very modest social grant for all potentially economically
active people. As the co-operation of employers is secured, the grant could be ‘cashed in’ by
those seeking employment, who, in addition to receiving the grant and undergoing training,
would be paid a wage. Those who choose not to seek employment via this route would
continue to receive the grant. Participating employers, in addition to being able to pay a lower
wage (by virtue of the grant system) would also be able to claim credit from the state for the
training provided. A scheme such as this would achieve the dual aims of (a) providing social
protection to the mass of people who currently drop straight through the large holes in South
Africa’s social protection system, and (b) reducing the cost of all labour by means of a
generalised wage subsidy.109  The requisite social institution within which the suggestions
above may be considered already exists in the form of the National Economic Development
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108 There will be a modest increase in the number of jobs in the construction sector because of the switch to more
labour-intensive methods.  For the rest, if the programme is to have a major impact, it will have to offer more than
short-term employment with a genuflection towards training.  In general, PWPs will not create significant skills or
entrepreneurs.  As a means of relieving poverty they will only be effective if the jobs offered are of relatively long
duration (years rather than months).  Although the private sector may be the nominal employers of those taking
part in the programme, they will be indirectly employed by the state, almost as though it were outsourcing certain
services.  Confusion about what can be achieved by the EPWP, revealed by McCord’s work, suggests that a
thoroughgoing review of the project is required, and that before the programme has even begun.
109 The introduction of a benefit transfer programme was suggested by the members of the task team appointed by
the Minister of Labour to examine the workings of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Meth, Naidoo and Shipman,
1996).
and Labour Council (Nedlac). All that is required is that the discussion above make its way
onto the agenda of that august body.
Poverty is a somewhat different matter. Not only does government have the capacity to
influence the number of poor directly (in particular, through the social grant system),110 the
number of poor, and the severity of their poverty, can, in principle, be determined with some
precision. The fact that these have not been is an indictment of all concerned. Calls for ‘more
research’ may elicit groans, and reasonably so – the appeal being sometimes little more than
thinly disguised self-interest at work. That would clearly not be true in the present case. The
problem of poverty is of such overwhelming importance, that no effort should have been
spared in addressing the difficulties raised above. Government is plainly delinquent in having
failed to comply with the Copenhagen Programme of Action stipulation of building an
appropriate poverty line (that should have been done by 1996). Its efforts to monitor and
evaluate its anti-poverty policies are also not beyond criticism. Statistics South Africa may be
criticised for failing to design and implement surveys that would enable poverty to be
measured with greater precision. The institution is wary of researchers who use social
surveys for purposes other than those for which they are designed,111 yet it has made no effort
to introduce a survey specifically tailored to discovering the (changing) extent of poverty (and
inequality). Poverty, as if anyone needed reminding, is public enemy number one. The
academic community could have made greater efforts to solve the child cost ratio and
household economies of scale problems.112 It could also have devoted more time to
addressing the social wage problem.113
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110 Whether it has the will to do so is, however, a different matter altogether.
111 Statements to this effect were made more than once by Dr Ros Hirschowits of Statistics South Africa at the
workshop on poverty held in Pretoria on 28th – 29th June 2004.  The point is well taken¯there are problems
involved in doing time series analysis on cross-section data.  When, however, there is nothing else available, one
has little choice in the matter.  Incidentally, Income and Expenditure Surveys (IESs), useful in the past for
reweighting the CPI, as well as for making poverty and inequality estimates, will henceforth be more amenable to
the former, than the latter purpose.  In the past, the IES was tied to the OHS (1995) or the LFS (2000).  This link will
not be maintained in the 2005 IES.
112 The pioneering efforts of the compiler of the Household Subsistence Level estimates, Prof. Potgieter, should have
stimulated research aimed at the admittedly hard job of pinning down these two variables.  It is ironic, but perhaps
predictable, that the impetus to the most substantial research into the cost of living in South Africa should have
come from the business community.  Both the Bureau for Market Research (BMR) in the University of South Africa
(UNISA), which estimates the value of the ‘Minimum Living Level’ and its more generous cousin, the
‘Supplemented Living Level’ and Prof. Potgieter’s unit in the University of Port Elisabeth, which publishes the
‘Household Subsistence Level’ and its more generous counterpart, the ‘Household Effective Level’, depend
heavily on corporate support.
113 In the magisterial “Measuring Poverty in South Africa”, Woolard and Leibbrandt (2001) steer clear of the social
wage.  They note that for measuring wellbeing: “… a person’s standard of living is generally taken to depend only
on the consumption of market goods.  While the limitations of this approach are well documented … the problems
involved in valuing access to public goods are enormous.  It is thus to a large extent for pragmatic reasons that
current consumption or current income is used as the indicator of wellbeing.”  (2001, p.42, emphasis in original)
Further on they observe that: “The choice of private consumption expenditure (PCE) per adult equivalent as an
appropriate welfare measure has a strong theoretical as well as intuitive appeal.” (2001, p.43)
If one played devil’s advocate and accepted the most recent World Bank PPP, the absolutely
poor (post social wage) could number as few as 700 000 (Table 3). By contrast, taking the
Deaton (1997) dollar-a-day estimate, and assuming that the social wage was perfectly
targeted (and that the error level in the social wage estimates was zero), could leave us with
16.5 million below the line that identifies the absolutely poor (Table 4a). Even if one did not
play games like this, the range of ignorance is still unacceptably high. Table 5a does suggest,
after all, that the post-social wage headcount could have been as low as 12.1 million in 2002
(11.3 million if the social wage is under-valued in the simulation model by 25 per cent). Which,
if any, of these figures is correct, is a matter of no little importance. Compounding the
difficulties of estimating the extent of the problem is the confusion that exists about the social
wage. Once again, government has been remiss – this time, by its failure to approach the
problem of estimating the overall impact of its anti-poverty policies on the poor, in a more
systematic (and energetic) manner. At least one of the studies it has commissioned so far
serves, if anything, only to heighten the confusion. Claims made by government about the
reduction in inequality consequent upon the ‘introduction’ of the social wage deserve nothing
but contempt – they are an insult to the poor.
Where should we go from here?  A first step might be to put the MDGs into a proper
perspective. Clemens, Kenny and Moss (2004, p.1) suggest that for some developing
countries, insistence on an ability to meet these goals when realistic assessment shows this
not to be possible, may undermine relations with donors abroad and impede reform at home.
Although such a fate is unlikely to befall South Africa, the ignorance of poverty levels at the
starting point of the journey to meet the goals, and the demonstrable inability to measure
progress towards meeting them, suggest that, as is the case with the poorer developing
countries that cannot meet them:
“The MDGs might be better viewed not as realistic targets but 
as reminders of the stark contrast between the world we want 
and the world we have, and a call to redouble our search for 
interventions to close the gap.”  (Clemens, Kenny and Moss,
2004, p.1)
Following this advice would permit a focus on the essential questions related to poverty
eradication in South Africa. Priorities in this regard, I would submit, are the following:
• A debate about the ‘official’ poverty lines must commence forthwith. If it is indeed
true that Statistics South Africa is sitting on a report which contains the proposed
future poverty lines (Babita et al, 2003), then this report must be released
immediately forthwith for general scrutiny. That scrutiny, it will be recalled, entails
the poverty lines meeting the criteria of scientific integrity and community credibility.
• The creation of a new survey instrument (or the re-engineering of an existing
instrument like the General Household Survey) that enables reliable estimates of
changes in absolute poverty to be made
• Bound up with this is a need, caused by the growing size of the social wage, and its
impact on incomes at the bottom end of the income distribution, to open a debate on 
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the meaning of poverty along the lines proposed in Saunders (1998), and its
measurement as suggested in Pyatt (2003).114
• Related in turn, is a social wage study supposedly being undertaken for government
by the HSRC. Of such importance is this topic that it merits a heavy concentration of
academic firepower on its redoubtable defences.
Until such time as satisfactory progress has been made with these endeavours, credible
estimates of progress in the struggle against poverty at the level of the country as a whole will
continue to be difficult, if not impossible to make.
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114 Engagement with the work of Noble et al (2004) is also necessary.
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Appendix: Tables 4-9
Table 4a: Nos. of people (1000s) below various poverty lines
Child cost ratio = 
H/hold econs of scale parameter = 
Error level (%) =
1.0
1.0
15
2002
 2002 Poverty
line (R/m in
2002 prices)
Pre-social
Wage
Post-social
Wage Change
Poverty line – short
description
wage
R 104 16 000 2 900 13 100 6. PPP $/d
R 214 19 600 16 500 3 100 5. Deaton $/d 
R 344 20 900 19 800 1 100 4. HSL 1pc
R 387 21 200 20 300 900 3. Official
R 422 21 500 20 500 1 000 2. Chen 
R 600 21 700 21 500 200 1. Arbitrary
1999
Pre-social
Wage
Post-social
Wage Change
R 104 12 200 7 600 4 600
R 214 17 300 16 000 1 300
R 344 18 900 18 400 500
R 387 19 400 19 100 300
R 422 19 500 19 200 300
R 600 20 300 20 300 0
1997
Pre-social
Wagel
Post-social
Wage Change
R 104 11 700 6 800 4 900
R 214 17 900 16 200 1 700
R 344 19 800 19 300 500
R 387 20 300 19 900 400
R 422 20 400 20 100 300
R 600 21 000 20 900 100
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Table 4a: Continued...
Poverty gap estimates (R billion/annum in 2002 prices)
2002 1999 1997
Pre-social
Wage
Pre-social
Wage
Pre-social
Wage
R 104 12.3 7.8 7.0
R 214 36.6 28.1 27.4
R 344 68.1 51.7 53.0
R 387 79.0 66.5 67.9
R 422 88.3 70.6 73.8
2002 1999 1997
Pre-social
Wage
Post-social
wage
Post-social
wage
R 104 0.3 2.6 2.1
R 214 14.6 19.2 18.1
R 344 43.6 41.9 42.3
R 387 53.9 56.4 57.0
R 422 62.5 60.5 62.8
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Table 4b: Nos. of people (1000s) below various poverty lines
Child cost ratio =
H/hold econs of scale parameter =
Error level (%) =
0.5
0.9
15
2002
2002 Poverty line
(R/m in 2002 prices)
Pre-social
wage Post-social wage Change
Poverty line –
short
description
R 319 20 300 17 500 2 800 6. $1, 2A + 2C
R 347 20 700 18 500 2 200 5. $1, 2A + 3C
R 557 21 600 21 200 400 4. HSL 1
R 576 21 600 21 300 300 3. Off, 2A + 2C
R 628 21 700 21 500 200 2. Chen, 2A +2C
R 684 21 800 21 600 200 1. Chen, 2A +3C
1999
Pre-social
wage Post-social wage Change
R 319 17 600 16 500 1 100
R 347 18 200 17 300 900
R 557 19 900 19 600 300
R 576 20 200 20 000 200
R 628 20 200 20 100 100
R 684 20 300 20 200 100
1997
Pre-social
wage Post-social wage Change
R 319 17 900 16 500 1 400
R 347 18 600 17 400 1 200
R 557 20 500 20 200 300
R 576 20 700 20 500 200
R 628 20 800 20 700 100
R 684 21 000 20 900 100
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Table 4c: Nos. of people (1000s) below various poverty lines
Child cost ratio =
H/hold econs of scale parameter = 
Error level (%) =
0.8
0.9
15
2002
2002 Poverty line
(R/m in 2002 prices)
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
Poverty line – short
description
R 271 20 000 17 000 3 000 6. $1, 2A + 2C
R 283 20 100 17 500 2 600 5. $1, 2A + 3C
R 454 21 500 20 600 900 4. HSL 2
R 489 21 500 20 800 700 3. Off, 2A + 2C
R 533 21 600 21 100 500 2. Chen, 2A + 2C
R 556 21 600 21 300 300 1. Chen, 2A + 3C
1999
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
R 271 17 400 16 200 1 200
R 283 17 700 16 600 1 100
R 454 19 500 19 000 500
R 489 19 800 19 600 200
R 533 19 900 19 700 200
R 556 20 000 19 800 200
1997
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
R 271 17 800 16 300 1 500
R 283 18 200 16 800 1 400
R 454 20 200 19 800 400
R 489 20 500 20 300 200
R 533 20 700 20 500 200
R 556 20 700 20 600 100
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Table 5a: Nos. of people (1000s) below various poverty lines
Child cost ratio =
H/hold econs of scale parameter = 
Error level (%) =
1.0
1.0
70
2002
2002 Poverty line
(R/m in 2002 prices)
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
Poverty line  –
short
Description
R 104  11 200   700  10 500 6. PPP $/d
R 214  17 400  12 100  5 300 5. Deaton $/d 
R 344  19 600  18 000  1 600 4. HSL 1pc
R 387  20 100  18 800  1 300 3. Official
R 422  20 300  19 400   900 2. Chen 
R 600  21 300  20 600   700 1. Arbitrary
1999
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
wage
R 104  7 100  3 300  3 800
R 214  14 100  11 900  2 200
R 344  17 000  16 100   900
R 387  18 000  17 300   700
R 422  18 100  17 600   500
R 600  19 400  19 200   200
1997
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
R 104  6 400  2 700  3 700
R 214  13 900  11 400  2 500
R 344  17 600  16 500  1 100
R 387  18 700  18 000   700
R 422  19 000  18 400   600
R 600  20 300  20 100   200
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Table 5a: Continued...
Poverty gap estimates (R billion/annum in 2002 prices)
2002 1999 1997
Pre-social
wage
Pre-social
wage
Pre-social
wage
R 104 6.5 3.4 2.8
R 214 26.2 17.7 16.4
R 344 55.6 38.3 37.7
R 387 65.8 52.1 51.3
R 422 74.3 56.0 56.7
2002 1999 1997
Post-social
wage
Post-social
wage
Post-social
wage
lR 104 0.0 0.8 0.6
R 214 8.2 10.9 9.6
R 344 32.7 29.5 28.4
R 387 42.2 42.5 41.3
R 422 50.5 46.3 46.6
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Table 5b: Nos. of people (1000s) below various poverty lines
Child cost ratio = 
H/hold econs of scale parameter = 
Error level (%) =
0.5
0.9
70
2002
 2002 Poverty line
(R/m in 2002
prices)
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
Poverty line  –  short
Description
R 319 17 600 12 900 4 700 6. $1, 2A + 2C
R 347 18 300 14 400 3 900 5. $1, 2A + 3C
R 557 20 800 19 700 1 100 4. HSL 1
R 576 20 900 19 900 1 000 3. Off, 2A + 2C
R 628 21 200 20 300 900 2. Chen, 2A + 2C
R 684 21 400 20 700 700 1. Chen, 2A + 3C
1999
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
R 319 13 500 11 800 1 700
R 347 14 500 12 900 1 600
R 557 18 000 17 400 600
R 576 18 600 18 100 500
R 628 18 900 18 400 500
R 684 19 200 18 900 300
1997
Pre-social
wage
Post-socia
lwage Change
R 319 13 000 10 900 2 100
R 347 14 100 12 300 1 800
R 557 18 400 17 700 700
R 576 19 000 18 500 500
R 628 19 400 18 900 500
R 684 19 800 19 500 300
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Table 5c: Nos. of people (1000s) below various poverty lines
Child cost ratio = 
H/hold econs of scale parameter =
Error level (%) = 
0.8
0.9
70
2002
2002 Poverty
line
(R/m in 2002
prices)
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
Poverty line – short
description
R 271 17 400 12 400 5 000 6. $1, 2A + 2C
R 283 17 800 13 200 4 600 5. $1, 2A + 3C
R 454 20 300 19 000 1 300 4. HSL 2
R 489 20 600 19 500 1 100 3. Off, 2A + 2C
R 533 20 800 19 900 900 2. Chen, 2A + 2C
R 556 20 900 20 100 800 1. Chen, 2A + 3C
1999
Pre-social
wage
Post-social
wage Change
R 271 13 700 11 700 2 000
R 283 14 100 12 200 1 900
R 454 17 500 16 700 800
R 489 18 300 17 800 500
R 533 18 500 18 000 500
R 556 18 700 18 300 400
1997
Pre-social
wage
Post-socialw
age Change
R 271 13 200 10 900 2 300
R 283 13 700 11 500 2 200
R 454 18 000 17 000 1 000
R 489 18 900 18 200 700
R 533 19 200 18 700 500
R 556 19 500 19 000 500
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Table 6a: Poverty at R214 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 1.0
Hh econs of scale = 1.0
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Social wage error 0.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 17 400 14 100 13 900
Post-social wage 12 100 11 900 11 400
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 19 600 17 300 17 900
Post-social wage 16 500 16 000 16 200
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 3 300 3 500 200
Post-social wage 200 700 500
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 300 1 700 -600
Post-social wage 500 300 -200
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 38.3 32.7 33.7
Post-social wage 26.6 27.6 27.7
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 43.1 40.2 43.4
Post-social wage 36.3 37.2 39.3
Poverty gap (R billions/ per annum)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 26.2 17.7 16.4
Post-social wage 8.2 10.9 9.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 36.6 28.1 27.4
Post-social wage 14.6 19.2 18.1
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Table 6b:Poverty at R214 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 1.0
Hh econs of scale = 1.0
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Social wage error 25.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 17 400 14 100 13 900
Post-social wage 11 300 11 900 11 400
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 19 600 17 300 17 900
Post-social wage 15 800 16 000 16 200
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 3 300 3 500 200
Post-social wage -600 -100 500
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 300 1 700 -600
Post-social wage -200 -400 -200
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 38.3 32.7 33.7
Post-social wage 24.9 27.6 27.7
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 43.1 40.2 43.4
Post-social wage 34.8 37.2 39.3
Poverty gap (R billions/ per annum)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 26.2 17.7 16.4
Post-social wage 7.1 10.9 9.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 36.6 28.1 27.4
Post-social wage 12.8 19.2 18.1
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Table 6c: Poverty at R214 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 1.0
Hh econs of scale = 1.0
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Social wage error -25.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 17 400 14 100 13 900
Post-social wage 12 900 11 900 11 400
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 19 600 17 300 17 900
Post-social wage 17 100 16 000 16 200
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 3 300 3 500 200
Post-social wage 1 000 1 500 500
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 300 1 700 -600
Post-social wage 1 100 900 -200
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 38.3 32.7 33.7
Post-social wage 28.4 27.6 27.7
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 43.1 40.2 43.4
Post-social wage 37.6 37.2 39.3
Poverty gap (R billions/ per annum)
(z = R214 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 26.2 17.7 16.4
Post-social wage 9.4 10.9 9.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 36.6 28.1 27.4
Post-social wage 16.4 19.2 18.1
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Table 7: Poverty at R344 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 1.0
Hh econs of scale = 1.0
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R344 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 19 600 17 000 17 600
Post-social wage 18 000 16 100 16 500
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 20 900 18 900 19 800
Post-social wage 19 800 18 400 19 300
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R344 per month per person in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 600 2 000 -600
Post-social wage 1 900 1 500 -400
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 000 1 100 -900
Post-social wage 1 400 500 -900
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R344 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 43.1 39.5 42.7
Post-social wage 39.6 37.4 40.0
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 46.0 43.9 48.0
Post-social wage 43.6 42.7 46.8
Poverty gap (R billions/ per annum)
(z = R344 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 55.6 38.3 37.7
Post-social wage 32.7 29.5 28.4
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 68.1 51.7 53.0
Post-social wage 43.6 41.9 42.3
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 Table 8: Poverty at R387 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 1.0
Hh econs of scale = 1.0
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R387 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 20 100 18 000 18 700
Post-social wage 18 800 17 300 18 000
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 21 200 19 400 20 300
Post-social wage 20 300 19 100 19 900
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R387 per month per person in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 100 1 400 -700
Post-social wage 1 500 800 -700
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 1 800 900 -900
Post-social wage 1 200 400 -800
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R387 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 44.2 41.8 45.4
Post-social wage 41.4 40.2 43.7
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 46.6 45.1 49.2
Post-social wage 44.7 44.4 48.3
Poverty gap (R billions/ per annum)
(z = R387 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 65.8 52.1 51.3
Post-social wage 42.2 42.5 41.3
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 79.0 66.5 67.9
Post-social wage 53.9 56.4 57.0
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  Table 9a: Poverty at R422 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 1.0
Hh econs of scale = 1.0
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Social wage error 0.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 20 300 18 100 19 000
Post-social wage 19 400 17 600 18 400
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 21 500 19 500 20 400
Post-social wage 20 500 19 200 20 100
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 200 1 300 -900
Post-social wage 1 800 1 000 -800
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 000 1 100 -900
Post-social wage 1 300 400 -900
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 44.7 42.0 46.1
Post-social wage 42.7 40.9 44.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 47.3 45.3 49.5
Post-social wage 45.1 44.6 48.8
Poverty gap (R billions/ per annum)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 74.3 56.0 56.7
Post-social wage 50.5 46.3 46.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 88.3 70.6 73.8
Post-social wage 62.5 60.5 62.8
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Table 9b: Poverty at R422 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 1.0
Hh econs of scale = 1.0
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Social wage error 25.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 20 300 18 100 19 000
Post-social wage 19 200 17 600 18 400
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 21 500 19 500 20 400
Post-social wage 20 400 19 200 20 100
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 200 1 300 -900
Post-social wage 1 600 800 -800
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 000 1 100 -900
Post-social wage 1 200 300 -900
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 44.7 42.0 46.1
Post-social wage 42.2 40.9 44.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 47.3 45.3 49.5
Post-social wage 44.9 44.6 48.8
Poverty gap (R billions/ per annum)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 74.3 56.0 56.7
Post-social wage 48.2 46.3 46.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 88.3 70.6 73.8
Post-social wage 60.1 60.5 62.8
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Table 9c: Poverty at R422 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 1.0
Hh econs of scale = 1.0
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Social wage error -25.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 20 300 18 100 19 000
Post-social wage 19 500 17 600 18 400
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 21 500 19 500 20 400
Post-social wage 20 700 19 200 20 100
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 200 1 300 -900
Post-social wage 1 900 1 100 -800
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 000 1 100 -900
Post-social wage 1 500 600 -900
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 44.7 42.0 46.1
Post-social wage 42.9 40.9 44.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 47.3 45.3 49.5
Post-social wage 45.5 44.6 48.8
Poverty gap (R billions/ per annum)
(z = R422 per month per person in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 74.3 56.0 56.7
Post-social wage 52.7 46.3 46.6
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 88.3 70.6 73.8
Post-social wage 64.9 60.5 62.8
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Table 10: Poverty at R557 level in 2002
Parameters
Child cost ratio = 0.5
Hh econs of scale = 0.9
Bottom bound (%) 50.0
Poverty headcount (1000s)
(z = R557 per month per adult equivalent in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 20 800 18 000 18 400
Post-social wage 19 700 17 400 17 700
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 21 600 19 900 20 500
Post-social wage 21 200 19 600 20 200
Changes in numbers of people below z
(z = R557 per month per adult equivalent in 2002)
02-99 02-97 99-97
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 2 800 2 400 -400
Post-social wage 2 300 2 000 -300
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 1 700 1 100 -600
Post-social wage 1 600 1 000 -600
Poverty rate (%)
(z = R557 per month per adult equivalent in 2002)
Sept 2002 Oct 1999 Oct 1997
70 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 45.8 41.8 44.6
Post-social wage 43.3 40.4 42.9
15 per cent under-reporting of expenditure
Pre-social wage 47.5 46.2 49.7
Post-social wage 46.6 45.5 49.0
 85 
